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[核武器] 美俄核裁军专题

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kktt 发表于 2009-1-22 20:28 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式

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Russia's new arms development
BY PAVEL PODVIG | 16 JANUARY 2009
We don't know at this point what the next U.S.-Russian arms control agreement will look like, but everyone in the international community expects it to be a step toward significantly reducing the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. The levels set in the Moscow Treaty, which Washington and Moscow signed in May 2002, commit them to reducing the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads on each side to no more than 1,700-2,200 warheads by 2012. One would expect that a post-Moscow Treaty agreement will bring much lower numbers.

Optimists suggest that each country could go to as low as 500 operationally deployed warheads. I think this would be difficult--in part because it would require further bending of the already lax counting rules for "operationally deployed warheads." A number such as 1,500 warheads would be easier to reach. The main problem with a 1,500-warhead level is that it's too close to the Moscow Treaty limit for the reduction to count as a dramatic disarmament step. Most likely then we'll end up with something in between, with 1,000-1,200 warheads representing a good bet.

If all of Russia's currently scheduled defense programs materialize, Moscow will find itself in a situation where its strategic nuclear arsenal will start growing."
While getting there will require skillful, difficult negotiations between the U.S. and Russian delegations, the hardest conversations will take place at home with the countries' respective military-industrial complexes. This is particularly so for Russia, where the political leadership already has given its defense industry and military a free hand in shaping Moscow's national security policy. Specifically, recent promises and commitments that Moscow has made regarding the future buildup of its strategic forces put Russia on a trajectory that's incompatible with substantial nuclear reductions. More directly, if all of the currently scheduled programs materialize, Russia will find itself in a situation where its strategic arsenal will start growing.

In fact, it already is growing--although that growth is masked by the dramatic reduction of old missiles with multiple warheads. But these missiles will be around for some time; it appears that the current plan is to keep old Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) around until about 2021, which is when the last SS-18 missile will turn 30 years old. I hope that if the United States and Russia agree on dramatic reductions in the near future, these missiles could be eliminated sooner--after all, they're old. But getting rid of the new Russian missiles, submarines, and bombers that are being built today will be much more difficult, presenting a potentially serious obstacle to cutting the number of nuclear warheads in Russia's arsenal much below 1,500.

In particular, two major new strategic systems are currently under development: (1) the Topol-M, or SS-27, ICBM; and (2) the Project 955 Borey submarine with Bulava missiles. In addition, Russia has resumed production of Tu-160 strategic bombers. None of these three programs have been large in terms of deployment, but even small numbers add up over time.

With Topol-M, the Strategic Rocket Forces have added about six new missiles a year for about a decade. In total, there are 65 missiles deployed today, each carrying a single warhead. The current plan is to continue deployment at about the same rate throughout the next few years, bringing the number of deployed missiles to 110-120 by 2015. The program, however, will undergo a major change in December when new Topol-M missiles will be equipped with multiple warheads. (This missile configuration is known as RS-24.) Assuming that the missiles will carry three warheads, Topol-Ms would then account for about 210 warheads, and the entire ICBM force would have about 800 warheads by 2015. As older missiles retire and the deployment of new Topol-Ms continue, the missile force would shrink to about 400 warheads, all deployed on new Topol-M missiles--although they won't be so new by that time.

Development of the sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), Bulava, has run into some serious problems, but Russia seems determined to continue the program, with the first Borey submarine scheduled to be deployed in either 2010 or 2011. Two more submarines are under construction, and the plan is to build eight of these ships in all. In the meantime, the Russian Navy will rely on six older Delta IV submarines. Assuming that the navy would maintain a fleet of eight submarines--both old and new--the total number of warheads on its SLBMs will stay at 600-700 over the next decade.

Finally, the number of Tu-160 bombers is expected to double in the next decade, with 30 aircraft expected to be in service by 2025-2030. It's reasonable to assume that older bombers will retire to keep the total number of bomber-carried nuclear weapons at the level of 400-500, which is slightly less than Russia has today.

Taken together, all of this means that Russia is planning to have about 1,400-1,600 nuclear warheads in its strategic force for some time. And this could be a conservative estimate. For example, there's a possibility that the multiple-warhead version of the Topol-M missile will carry more than three warheads. There's also persistent talk about developing a new multiple-warhead missile that would be deployed alongside Topol-Ms. If this were to occur, the number of warheads in the Russian arsenal would be pushed even higher. More importantly, most of these warheads would be deployed on relatively new systems that could stay in service for many years. And if history is any guide, liquidating them would be a contentious domestic issue.

Nothing, of course, is set in stone. Plans can be changed. After all, the point of having arms reductions is to cut back on weapon development programs. But it would be much harder to do this once these programs gain a momentum--making a new U.S.-Russian disarmament agreement much more urgent.

[ 本帖最后由 kktt 于 2009-1-22 20:37 编辑 ]
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-1-22 20:31 | 显示全部楼层
Formulating the next U.S.-Russian arms control agreement
BY PAVEL PODVIG | 18 DECEMBER 2008
As the United States waits for a new administration to take office in January, expectations are high that arms control talks with Russia will be revitalized shortly thereafter. Parties in both countries--no matter political persuasion--think Washington and Moscow should move quickly to devise a new disarmament agreement that would replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires in December 2009. In my June column, I wrote that the optimism regarding a new treaty might not be warranted--the differences in the U.S. and Russian approaches to the next step of the disarmament process are serious and will be difficult to overcome.

Instead of creating a new arms control treaty, Russia and the United States should keep START and concentrate on a Moscow Treaty-plus agreement that would complement START by providing additional verification procedures applicable only to delivery systems and warheads that would be declared as not 'operationally deployed.'"
That said, it doesn't mean that these differences can't be reconciled. Below, I try to outline the three major points of disagreement and propose potential solutions to them.

Disagreement #1: Counting rules
The United States would prefer to count only "operationally deployed" warheads, giving Washington significant flexibility to assign some of its strategic nuclear systems to conventional missions and reducing its arsenal by "downloading," i.e., decreasing the number of warheads associated with missiles and bombers. For example, if Washington gets its way, the four U.S. Trident submarines that no longer carry ballistic missiles wouldn't be counted against the treaty ceiling--same for two of the remaining fourteen U.S. submarines that are expected to be in overhaul at any given time. Furthermore, the missiles on those 14 submarines only would be counted with the actual number of nuclear warheads they carry--about five for nuclear missiles and zero for conventional missiles--even though each of them can carry as many as eight warheads. This would allow Washington to reduce its "operationally deployed" warheads without making any significant changes to its force and giving it substantial "upload potential," the capability to quickly increase the number of deliverable warheads by bringing back and deploying reserve warheads. The U.S. military, of course, likes having this kind of flexibility, but Russia looks at it with serious suspicion--especially because Moscow doesn't have a similar capability.

Russia would like to see a limit on the number of delivery systems (land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles and bombers) that can be used to carry nuclear warheads, regardless of the number of warheads these platforms actually carry. This means, among other things, that those delivery systems that have been "downloaded" or converted to a conventional mission would have to be counted in full. For Moscow, this is a way to guarantee that the United States doesn't have upload potential.

Disagreement #2: U.S. conventional capabilities
It's all well and good that the United States reduces its nuclear arsenal, but Russia is concerned that this reduction will come with an increase in the number of U.S. conventional warheads, which, Russia argues, could be as effective as nuclear warheads if the United States would ever launch a first strike against Russian strategic forces. This premise might be debatable, but it doesn't change the fact that Moscow is insisting that any new treaty should include measures to limit conventional capabilities.

Disagreement #3: START's transparency and verification mechanisms
Neither Russia nor the United States say they are happy about these. Overall, both sides believe that the verification system should be much simpler--i.e., some of the current elements, such as continuous portal monitoring at missile production facilities, seem expensive, intrusive, and unnecessary.

Possible solutions
The solution to the counting rules problem could be combining the approaches adopted by the two strategic arms control agreements that are in force today--START and the Moscow Treaty. Russia's position on counting rules is more or less what START requires--all strategic delivery systems are counted as carrying the maximum number of warheads they can carry regardless of how many they actually possess. The U.S. position is much closer to that of the Moscow Treaty, which takes into account only "operationally deployed" warheads--a designation it doesn't define with any precision. Not surprisingly, the United States sees the next treaty as essentially the Moscow Treaty with new numerical limits and some token verification measures. Russia has already indicated that it won't agree to such an agreement.

The Obama administration will probably tweak the U.S. proposal, but I wouldn't count on any breakthroughs: The current U.S. position isn't a Bush administration whim, but a reflection of prevailing U.S. thinking on the topic. That's why most proposals made by independent experts, whether Russian or American, assume that the new agreement would have to accept the U.S. approach and count only "operationally deployed" nuclear warheads. But we shouldn't expect any dramatic changes in the Russian approach either, as it reflects how Moscow's military and political leadership thinks about its relationship with the United States.

Thus, my proposed compromise: Keep both counts. This way, Washington and Moscow could extend START's terms not as a stopgap measure intended to buy time to negotiate a new agreement, but as a way to hold each other accountable to the maximum possible capabilities of their strategic forces. After all, START's counting rules and verification procedures were structured to make sure that the treaty sets the limit that neither country can cross. It does exaggerate the number of warheads that are actually deployed, but this is hardly a problem--as long as we understand that START gives us the upper limit and not the actual number, we should be able to live with that.

At the same time, it would make perfect sense to count "operationally deployed" warheads as well. This is what the Moscow Treaty was supposed to do, but its counting procedures never materialized since Russia and the United States weren't able to agree on them--in part because they saw the "operational warhead" counting rules as a substitute to the START rules, not as a complement to them. That's why if we keep the START rules and procedures in place, agreeing on the definition of "operationally deployed" warheads should be easier.

Specific definitions and verification measures could be negotiated by the Bilateral Implementation Commission, which the Moscow Treaty created. Since these definitions and measures wouldn't substitute those included in START, negotiating them shouldn't be difficult. For example, it would be easy to agree that submarines in overhaul shouldn't be counted as "operationally deployed"--something that's readily verifiable without intrusive measures. (However, these submarines would still be included in the START count unless they're liquidated in compliance with its procedures.) If any side would want to lower its "operationally deployed" count, that side would be welcome to do so as long as it's ready to submit the system it wants to exclude from that count to the agreed verification process. In another example, if the United States wanted to exclude its conventional Trident missiles from the balance, it would have to submit them to inspections. But if Washington decided that the inspections are too intrusive, it would have the option of keeping these systems on the nuclear side of its balance sheet, just as it does today under START.

A double count would be more complex than the current count, but it would reflect reality-- the number of actually deployed nuclear warheads isn't as high as the START counting rules show, which should be reflected in the record. Along those lines, the START rules should be preserved, too, since they reflect another important reality--the maximum number of warheads that the United States and Russia can deploy. Eventually, this is the number that we need to bring to zero, but we could agree for the moment that it will take time to do so.

In practical terms, this means that Russia and the United States should extend START without any changes. And instead of creating something new, the countries should keep START and concentrate on a Moscow Treaty-plus agreement that would complement START by providing additional verification procedures applicable only to those delivery systems and warheads that would be declared as not "operationally deployed." Such an approach would also help address Russia's concern about the conventional capabilities of the U.S. force. While not limiting that capability directly, it would provide a way to continue taking all U.S. strategic systems into account in the overall balance--whether they were converted to conventional missions or not.

Dealing with the complexity of the verification and inspection mechanism doesn't mean throwing away START either. After all, START doesn't require its parties to carry out all of the inspections, it only gives them the right to do so. It would be perfectly appropriate for the Joint Compliance and Implementation Commission, which manages the process, to agree that the parties have no interest in conducting certain inspections (something Russian and U.S. military professionals could decide), without necessarily forfeiting their rights.

A two-tier approach to nuclear weapons reductions would certainly require some changes in long-established arms control policies. But it would seem to give both the United States and Russia common ground for taking the next step in reducing their nuclear forces in a mutually agreed, legally binding, and verified way.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-1-22 20:32 | 显示全部楼层

奥巴马可能与俄罗斯签署削减核武器协议

俄新网RUSNEWS.CN华盛顿1月22日电 美国新任总统奥巴马和国务卿希拉里·克林顿面临着与俄罗斯就削减武器问题、反导问题以及北约扩张等问题进行对话的“新机遇”。这是美国参议院外交委员会主席、民主党议员约翰·凯利(John F. Kerry)做出的表示。

凯利周三在美参议院举行会议期间说:“我深信,一年内我们将有机会与俄罗斯举行谈判并签署一系列协议,其中包括减少核弹头数量到1000枚以下,这将是有史以来最低水平。”
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-1-22 20:33 | 显示全部楼层

奥巴马4月穿梭访问欧洲 或访俄罗斯

据俄罗斯《生意人报》报道,据接近美国国务院的消息人士1月21日透露,奥巴马总统对俄罗斯的首次访问可能会今年4月份进行。届时白宫新主人将首次穿梭访问欧洲,计划4月2日访问英国,参加二十国集团峰会,首次与俄总统梅德韦杰夫会谈,然后于4月3-4日前往法德边境城市参加北约成立 60周年庆祝峰会,之后可能飞往莫斯科进行正式访问。

  俄总统办公厅消息人士1月21日表示,目前尚未商议奥巴马的访俄行程,截至当日俄官方渠道尚未收到在此方面的任何提议。不过,如果上述消息得到证实,那么将意味着美国新政府确实认为俄罗斯是优先伙伴,这将促使俄美关系继续改善。俄总统办公厅正在筹划俄美总统今年4月份在伦敦二十国峰会期间的首次会晤,但是如果奥巴马准备访问莫斯科的话,那么两国元首就没必要在伦敦进行双边会晤。

  据美国国务院消息人士透露,在奥巴马访俄之前国务卿希拉里必将先行访问莫斯科。据悉,她可能会在3月份访俄,不排除此次访问与她首次欧洲穿梭访问之行安排在一起的可能,因为她将参加今年3月的北约成员国外长会议。俄罗斯外交部1月21日表示,目前尚未商议希拉里访俄的任何具体日期。

  美国国务院认为,整个2月份新任国务卿的主要工作方向将是继续组建自己的班底。事实上,她的主要助手现在已经明确,其中政治事务副国务卿伯恩斯将留任,此前曾任克林顿政府国家安全委员会欧洲司司长的戈尔顿将负责俄罗斯方向。另外,负责奥巴马政府对俄政策的还有前任卡耐基基金会莫斯科中心计划部主任马克福尔,他将被任命为国家安全委员会俄罗斯方向的负责人。

  希拉里本人日前在参议院国际事务委员会听证会上宣布,新政府主要优先方向是拟定能够替代将于2009年12月5日到期的《第一阶段削减战略进攻武器条约》。去年12月份俄副外长里亚布科夫和美国副国务卿鲁德已经开始就此磋商,当时俄外交部宣布,双方就新的战略进攻武器限制条约方面的谈判可能会促使俄美关系进一步改善,它的签署将是美国新总统奥巴马与俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫的首次成功合作。显然,《第一阶段削减战略进攻武器条约》将是奥巴马和希拉里访俄的主要话题之一。

  俄罗斯副外长里亚布科夫去年底曾经宣布,俄美双方在《第一阶段削减战略进攻武器条约》问题上的谈判必定将与欧洲反导系统部署问题挂钩,因为双方在反导问题上的谈判将会最为困难,不过美国新政府在反导问题上的立场有所缓和,莫斯科对此充满期待。
liudao 发表于 2009-1-22 21:20 | 显示全部楼层
现在,民主党同时掌握政府和国会,这在近年是少有的.如果他们下决心干一件事的话,没有干不成的.就削减一事,静观事态发展吧.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-2-5 23:13 | 显示全部楼层


Long-term force projections

As I wrote in the last Bulletin Online column, it would be quite difficult for Russia to reduce the number of its strategic nuclear warheads below about 1500 if it is serious about completing all the development programs that are currently underway. The charts on the left (the image is clickable) illustrate this point.

The assumptions behind this chart are fairly conservative. I assume 30 years lifetime for R-36MUTTH and R-36M2 missiles - this means that the former will be gone by 2014 and the latter (40 of them) - by 2022. The currently deployed UR-100NUTTH will serve a bit longer and I assume that the last of them will be decommissioned in 2018. All Topol missiles will be removed from service by 2015, which assumes their service life of about 21-22 years.

The plans for Topol-M deployment announced in 2006 assumed that by the end of 2015 the Rocket Forces will have 114 Topol-M missiles. This means that the deployment rate is about 7 missiles a year - not far from what has been demonstrated so far. The main change is that starting in 2009 Topol-M missiles will be deployed with multiple warheads. I assume that the MIRVed Topol-M/RS-24 will carry three warheads, although a higher number - up to seven - seems to be possible. The 65 Topol-M missiles that have been already deployed will probably be left with a single warhead.

With submarines, the assumption is that Russia will retire the Project 667BDR submarines in the next two years (if it hasn't done so already) and will keep six Project 667BDRM submarines with R-29RM Sineva missiles. The first Project 955 submarine with Bulava missiles (carrying 16 missiles with 6 warheads) will enter force in 2011. I assume that Project 667BDRM ships will be removed from service as the new Project 955 submarines enter service, so the total number of submarines will never be more than eight.

As it turned out, I misinterpreted the reports about new Tu-160 production - bringing the number of these aircraft to 30 by 2020 is something that the industry is hoping for, not the actual plan. This does not change the projection, however, since the number of warheads carried by bombers still assumed to stay at the current level (it also assumes that all Tu-95MS carry 6 ALCMs).

As I mentioned, these are conservative assumptions - if MIRVed Topol-M carries more than three warheads or if Russia decides to develop and deploy a new liquid-fuel missile or if Project 667BDRM submarines stay in force longer, the number of warheads will be higher than 1500. Accelerated withdrawal of old ICBMs could help somewhat, but not very much. If Russia is serious about reducing its nuclear arsenal, it would have to cut the new programs. This is unlikely to be easy.

[Aviation] [Navy] [Rocket Forces] [Strategic forces] [January 25, 2009]
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-6-22 16:16 | 显示全部楼层
俄罗斯宣布大幅削减核弹头 美国未必肯跟随

  据俄罗斯《生意人报》报道,6月22日俄美将在日内瓦就拟定新条约替代将于今年12月5日到期的《第一阶段削减战略进攻性武器条约》的问题进行第三轮谈判,为此俄总统梅德韦杰夫6月20日在荷兰访问时宣布俄方准备大幅削减核弹头及其运载工具,建议美方做出对等回应,同时消除俄方在反导问题上的严重担忧。俄专家认为,将削减战略武器与放弃反导系统相挂钩的条件未必会被美方所接受。

  俄总统梅德韦杰夫6月20日在阿姆斯特丹发表声明,明确俄方在战略武器条约谈判问题上的立场,这项声明实际上成为美国总统奥巴马7月7日开始访俄期间的会谈的前提条件。梅德韦杰夫宣布,俄罗斯准备与《第一阶段削减战略进攻性武器条约》相比数倍削减战略武器载体,这种立场是完全可以理解的。俄联邦科学院世界经济和国际关系研究所研究员德沃尔金退役少将指出,根据现行削减战略武器条约,俄美双方的战略载体(陆基和海基导弹、重型轰炸机)的数量不应超过1600枚(架),如是双方能够达成数倍削减战略载体的协议,实际上俄罗斯几乎将没有什么可以再削减的。他说:“截止到2009年1月俄罗斯战略载体数量实际上已经不会超过650件。”

  莫斯科理工学院裁军、能源和生态问题研究中心主任季亚科夫指出:“对俄方来说重要的正是削减运载工具数量,因为美国人的重点在于削减核弹头,从而借此拥有大量可恢复的核潜力。如果我们在对等削减核弹头上达成一致,却在美国现在拥有较多数量的载体问题上让步,那么美国人将会得到较大优势。”

  俄总统6月20日同时指出,俄美双方核弹头数量应当低于2002年莫斯科条约规定的水平,2002年俄美签署的《削减战略进攻潜力条约》规定各自核弹头的数量应削减至1700-2200枚。梅德韦杰夫和奥巴马今年4月在伦敦二十国集团峰会期间会晤时曾经达成一致,确认双方准备将各自的核弹头数量减少到该条约规定水平之下,美国国务院消息人士当时透露,最低极限水平将是1500枚核弹头,俄外交部消息人士指出,这一数字是可以达到的。

  但是,另外还有许多问题引起俄罗斯的严重关注,其中之一就是战略导弹装备非核弹头的前景问题。俄总统指出,这种武器装备可能会损害战略稳定,莫斯科对此表示担心,因为美国拥有大量高精战略武器,而俄罗斯几乎没有。俄外交部消息人士透露,莫斯科希望在新的战略武器条约中加入对此类武器装备的限制条款。梅德韦杰夫还指出,新条约谈判中重要的是保持旧条约中关于只能在本国部署战略进攻武器的条款,俄方担心美国会在第三国境内部署核武器。实际上,在俄美新条约谈判道路上的主要障碍仍是反导问题。俄总统特别强调,俄方提出的大量削减战略武器及其载体的建议只会在美方消除俄方在此问题上的担忧后才有可能,此举实际上是将俄方准备削减核力量与美方放弃反导计划或对其进行重大调整捆绑在了一起,今年5月俄总理普京已经公开提出了上述条件。

  美国国务院暂时尚未就俄总统提出的条件发表任何评论。今年5月美国国务院核裁军和谈判代表陶舍尔曾经宣布,美国计划在欧洲部署反导系统的问题不会成为俄美双方讨价还价的筹码,因此俄总统公开宣布的强硬立场可能会对双方削减战略武器条约的谈判前景蒙上一层阴影。
liudao 发表于 2009-6-22 16:47 | 显示全部楼层
俄美所谓的削减至1500枚以下,是指载具数量,还是核弹头数量?
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-6-22 16:55 | 显示全部楼层
俄美所谓的削减至1500枚以下,是指载具数量,还是核弹头数量?
liudao 发表于 2009-6-22 16:47


弹头
liudao 发表于 2009-6-22 17:02 | 显示全部楼层
如果是弹头,削减的难度就太大了。
美国18艘战略核潜艇,432枚导弹,弹头就不止1500枚。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-6-22 17:07 | 显示全部楼层
弹头都是有寿命的,美国如果不想裁剪,10年后那就只能重新生产替换才能维持数量
shaolin1254 发表于 2009-6-22 18:11 | 显示全部楼层
咱们有500左右弹头用来2次反击就差不多了
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-6-22 18:51 | 显示全部楼层
为什么是500?而不是100,也不是1000?
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-7-2 15:32 | 显示全部楼层
美国和俄罗斯双方就限制导弹数量达成一致

  中新网7月2日电 据日本共同社报道,美国国家安全委员会俄罗斯欧亚事务高级委员麦克福尔1日向记者透露,在目前美俄正在谈判的《第一阶段削减战略武器条约》期满后的新约束条约中,双方同意不仅对核弹头数量,还将对洲际弹道导弹等核弹头运载工具的数量设定上限。

  据报道,处于运载工具不利地位的俄罗斯向美国提出了削减要求。美国高官对此明确表示同意后,跨越了两国签订新约束条约的一道壁垒。

  第一阶段中规定运载工具的上限为1600个,而2002年美俄签署的《削减进攻性战略武器条约》(莫斯科条约)中未就运载工具作出规定。

  此外麦克福尔还确认,战略性核弹头数量的上限将比莫斯科条约中规定的1700~2200枚要少。虽然他未提及具体数字,但美国专家中的主流观点是美俄正在以1500枚为目标展开谈判。

  报道称,莫斯科条约未就相互验证履行情况的具体手续作出规定,但麦克福尔强调,后续条约“有必要规定明确的验证手续”。他认为除第一阶段的验证措施外,还有必要采用利用新技术进行验证。
shaolin1254 发表于 2009-7-5 12:39 | 显示全部楼层
没有验证履行情况的条约,意义何在?俄罗斯有了面子可以合理的减少核武库,降低维持资金?
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-7-6 16:01 | 显示全部楼层
U.S.-Russia arms reduction deal agreed
www.chinaview.cn  2009-07-06 15:34:00                   Print
    MOSCOW, July 6 (Xinhua) -- The text of the framework strategic arms cut agreement which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama are supposed to sign has been fully agreed, the Interfax news agency reported Monday.

    "The text has been agreed," an unnamed source at the Russian Foreign Ministry was quoted as saying.

    A day earlier, Interfax cited an unnamed senior source from the Russian Foreign Ministry as saying that the framework agreement had not been finally negotiated.

    Obama is scheduled to arrive in Moscow later on Monday to meet Medvedev and outline benchmarks for further work on an agreement to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) before it expires on Dec. 5.

    The three-day visit will be the U.S. president's first trip to Russia since he took office in January.
天堂风暴 发表于 2009-7-6 22:15 | 显示全部楼层
纽约时报近日报道了,美国总统奥巴马上大学的时候就有建立一个无核世界的梦想,并在当年(1984年)哥伦比亚大学学生办的校内刊物《Sundial》上发表了一篇关于核裁军的文章,其中提到了建立一个无核世界。他宣誓就职前夕,这篇文章被美国人翻了出来。
另外,英国可能要成为第一个主动单方面放弃核武器的国家了。丫快挺不住了,明年他预算赤字要到gdp13%了,工党、保守党和自由党现在都在考虑单方面弃核了,治理赤字,削减政府开支,首当其冲的就是三叉戟这种耗资昂贵,却几乎不太可能用到的玩意。而且无论导弹还是核弹头,英国自己都不生产什么了,放弃对英国本国国防工业没太大影响。当然单方面核裁军也只是选项之一,英国人考虑的其他选项包括用陆基导弹和/或潜射巡航弹来代替三叉戟、保留1到2艘SSBN(现在国际形势无需保持24小时戒备,有需要时出动即可)以及和法国共用核武器来分摊费用。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-7-6 23:01 | 显示全部楼层
Russian, U.S. presidents sign joint statement on anti-missile issue
www.chinaview.cn  2009-07-06 22:51:58                   Print
    MOSCOW, July 6 (Xinhua) -- Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his visiting U.S. counterpart Barack Obama have signed here a joint statement on anti-missile issue, said a news release from the Kremlin's press office on Monday.

    Based on the consensus reached between the two leaders in early April in London, said the statement, Russia and the United States plan to continue discussion on cooperation concerning the issue of anti-missiles and the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles.

    On a basis of mutual respect for security interests, it said, both sides will actively seek the optimal way to strengthen reciprocal strategic relations.

    Medvedev and Obama also have consigned experts from both countries to analyze the threat brought by missiles facing the world, and come up with relevant advices.

    Obama started his three-day working visit to Russia on Monday afternoon, the first one since taking office in January.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-7-6 23:37 | 显示全部楼层
美俄发表联合声明同意削减战略核武器
http://www.sina.com.cn  2009年07月06日23:05  中国网
  中国网7月6日电 综合媒体报道,美国白宫官员今晚宣布,美国总统奥巴马与俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫发表联合声明,同意在两国削减战略核武器协议生效后7年内,俄美分别把各自所部署的核弹头数量降至1500枚-1675枚。

  同时,美国官员还宣布,俄罗斯将允许美国经过俄领空运输士兵和武器至阿富汗。协议称,俄罗斯将每年允许不超过4500架次军用飞机通过其领空,但是这些军用飞机不得在俄罗斯领土上停留。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-7-7 01:05 | 显示全部楼层
俄新网RUSNEWS.CN莫斯科7月6日电 俄罗斯与美国计划将核弹头的数量削减几乎一半--削减至1500-1675个,而运载工具则削减至500-1100个。这些数据作为新的《削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》的参考,来源于俄美两国总统今天在克里姆林宫谈判时达成一致的文件--《进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器问题谅解备忘录》。

《进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器问题谅解备忘录》中还写到,新的《削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》有效期将长达10年,前提是在这个期限内它不会被后续的条约代替。
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