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[核武器] 美俄核裁军专题

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 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-7-7 01:27 | 显示全部楼层
2009年度的美国核武器部署概况:
http://thebulletin.metapress.com ... wq9613/fulltext.pdf
2009年度的俄国核武器部署概况:
http://thebulletin.metapress.com ... 137734/fulltext.pdf
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-7-7 02:07 | 显示全部楼层
Russian, U.S. presidents sign joint statement on anti-missile issue
www.chinaview.cn  2009-07-06 22:51:58                   Print
    MOSCOW, July 6 (Xinhua) -- Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his visiting U.S. counterpart Barack Obama have signed here a joint statement on anti-missile issue, the Kremlin said on Monday.

    Based on the consensus reached between the two leaders in early April in London, Russia and the United States plan to continue the discussion on cooperation concerning the issue of anti-missiles and the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles, the Kremlin's press office said in a news release.

    On a basis of mutual respect for security interests, it said, both sides will actively seek the optimal way to strengthen reciprocal strategic relations.

    Medvedev and Obama have also consigned experts from both countries to analyze the threat brought by missiles facing the world, and come up with relevant advices.

    "Russia and the United States reaffirm their readiness for equitable and mutually-advantageous cooperation with all the parties concerned, which share the assessment of the danger coming from the global proliferation of ballistic missiles," the Interfax news agency reported, citing the joint statement.

    The two presidents also urged "all countries possessing missile potentials to refrain from steps that may lead to missile proliferation and undermine regional and global stability."

    Obama started his three-day working visit to Russia on Monday afternoon, his first since taking office in January.

    The two leaders have also negotiated the drafts of a joint communique on the framework deal on strategic arms reductions, a joint statement on missile defense, and a series of accords including the U.S. military transit to Afghanistan via Russian territory, as well as the resumption of bilateral military cooperation, on their first day of talks.

    They also presented a plan to set up a Russian-U.S. presidential commission for cooperation, the Interfax said.
Nighthawk 发表于 2009-7-7 14:41 | 显示全部楼层
美俄发表联合声明同意削减战略核武器
http://www.sina.com.cn  2009年07月06日23:05  中国网
  中国网7月6日电 综合媒体报道,美国白宫官员今晚宣布,美国总统奥巴马与俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫发表联合声明,同意在 ...
kktt 发表于 2009-7-6 23:37

汗这个4500架次,这要是C17或者C5一次运个50、100吨货,那就是几十万吨货,没准还有好几万人。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-8-7 14:40 | 显示全部楼层
Force reductions in 2009

The full July 2009 START MOU will not be released until October (this may well be the last START MOU, by the way), but the first deputy of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Col. Sergei Ryzhkov, provided a glimpse in Krasnaya Zvezda interview. According to Ryzhkov, under START rules Russia has 811 strategic launchers with 3906 warheads. This means that the only change since January is the withdrawal of three SS-25/Topol missile.

The actual numbers are somewhat lower - 631 and 2822 respectively (in fact, they the number of operationally deployed warheads is even lower, since I use the rules that count submarines in overhaul).

[Rocket Forces] [August 4, 2009]

http://russianforces.org/blog/20 ... tions_in_2009.shtml
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-8-15 04:57 | 显示全部楼层
美国政府削减核武器项目经费

[据NTI网站2009年8月13日报道] 据《空军时报》当日报道,在白宫出台其新核政策以前,美国国会委员会叫停了一项重要核武器型号的更新工作。

    能源部提出2010财年经费中的6400万美元用于开展B-61-Mod-12重力炸弹的必要的持续研究。该型号炸弹是60年代B-61热核装置的改进型,计划于2017年部署。然而,众议院拨款委员会建议搁置这项工作,并指出美国在远期核政策出台以前,不应继续对这种"本质上属于新型核武器"的研究进行投资。

    国会委员会在一项附有能源部拨款立法的报告中说,"美国的核武器和核联合体是冷战时期建造的遗留资产,……核武器当量太高,而使用的范围又太小。核武器联合体的规模和成本远大于目前或未来所需要的。"报告说,"在核战略出台以前,是不可能制定出合理的核武库和联合体规模及构成决议的。"

    委员会表示,希望"后冷战时代"的核战略能够在国防部的《四年国防评估》或者能源部的《核态势评估》中得到明确阐述。这两份文件计划于明年公布。(核信息院 杨力)
liudao 发表于 2009-8-15 05:17 | 显示全部楼层
新华社日内瓦8月12日电 中国外交部长杨洁篪12日在日内瓦裁军谈判会议(裁谈会)上发表讲话,介绍了中国对推进国际军控、裁军和防扩散进程的看法,并重点阐述了中国的核裁军政策主张。    杨洁篪表示,为推动军控、裁军和防扩散进程健康发展,国际社会应秉持互信、互利、平等、协作的新安全观,致力于营造和谐、稳定的国际和地区安全环境;应坚持多边主义,充分发挥联合国等多边机制作用,不断巩固和加强现有多边军控、裁军和防扩散体系;应维护国际战略平衡与稳定,在相互尊重和平等对待各方合理安全利益的基础上,实现各国普遍安全;应加强对话与合作,坚持以和平方式解决国际争端。
    杨洁篪说,全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器,实现无核武器世界,是一切热爱和平人们的共同夙愿,也是中国一贯倡导并不懈追求的目标。为实现上述目标,必须切实推进核裁军进程。美俄作为拥有最庞大核武库的国家,对核裁军负有特殊和优先的责任,应继续大幅削减核武库,为最终全面、彻底核裁军创造必要条件。核武器国家应尽早承诺不首先使用核武器。国际社会应尽早就无核武器国家安全保证问题谈判缔结国际法律文书。应放弃谋求绝对战略优势的做法,不发展破坏全球战略稳定的导弹防御系统,不在外太空部署武器。作为长期目标,国际社会还应谈判缔结《全面禁止核武器公约》。
    杨洁篪指出,必须消除核武器扩散的风险,进一步加强国际防扩散机制,坚持通过政治外交手段解决防扩散问题,摒弃一切双重标准做法。必须大力促进核能的和平利用及其国际合作。不能以防扩散为由剥夺《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国和平利用核能权利。
    杨洁篪表示,中国致力于建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界。中国重视军控、裁军和防扩散,并为此作出了应有贡献。他强调,中国始终恪守在任何时候和任何情况下都不首先使用核武器,无条件不对无核武器国家和无核武器区使用或威胁使用核武器的承诺,是唯一作出上述承诺的核武器国家,这一政策今后也不会改变。中国从未在别国部署核武器,从来没有、今后也不会参加任何形式的核军备竞赛。中国愿同国际社会一道,共同推动《全面禁止核试验条约》早日生效,支持裁谈会尽早启动《禁止生产核武器用裂变材料条约》谈判。中国反对大规模杀伤性武器及其运载工具的扩散,主张通过对话与谈判和平解决朝鲜半岛核问题和伊朗核问题。
    杨洁篪说,外空领域正日益面临武器化的危险。采取切实有效的多边措施,防止外空武器化和军备竞赛,具有重大的战略意义,符合各国的共同利益。
    裁谈会是目前国际上唯一的国际多边军控谈判机构,现正在举行2009年第三期会议。今年5月底,裁谈会打破了持续12年的僵局,就2009年度会议的工作计划草案达成一致。裁谈会现有成员65个,中国于1980年正式加入。
    在裁谈会发表讲话前,杨洁篪在日内瓦万国宫会见了联合国日内瓦办事处总干事、裁谈会秘书长奥尔忠尼启泽。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-8-21 14:37 | 显示全部楼层
俄罗斯反对销毁战术核武器
http://www.china-spacenews.com     2009年08月19日 

          俄罗斯前安全会议负责人Andrei Kokoshin近日警告说,俄军方反对销毁非战略核武器。
  现任俄罗斯科学院“国际安全问题研究所”负责人的Andrei Kokoshin表示,“虽然签署了限制核军备的新协议,但俄罗斯仍应保持拥有战术核武器。”他说,“在保卫国家安全上,俄罗斯对战术和战略核武器都需要。”
  Kokoshin指出,美国的某些官员建议销毁美国目前在欧洲部署的战术核武器。“但我们国家的安全是不同的。战术核武器对我们是有益的并且是保卫国家安全所必要的。”
  分析家Robert Norris和Hans Kristensen认为,俄罗斯拥有约5400枚战术核武器,有2000枚以上装备在巡航导弹、鱼雷和其他运载系统上。
  Kokoshin补充说,如果华盛顿和莫斯科同意削减各自部署的战术核武器,两国将必须要制定重要的比限制战略核武器时使用的要更为复杂的核查程序。
shaolin1254 发表于 2009-8-21 17:27 | 显示全部楼层
战术核武器?核炮弹,核导弹,核鱼雷,手提箱还有啥?当初不销毁中程核武器不就没这事了。。。。。。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-8-21 20:33 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 kktt 于 2010-3-28 20:09 编辑

毛子的战术核武器:

NONSTRATEGIC AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS
ABM/Air defense
51t6/53t6 Gorgon/Gazelle   0/68 1989/1986 1 x 1,000/10 682
Sa-10 Grumble 1,900 1980 1 x low 630
Land-based air
Bombers/fighters ~524 aSM, bombs 650
Naval
Submarines/surface ships/air SLCM, aSW, SaM, aSM, DB,
torpedoes
700

SUBTOTAL NONSTRATEGIC AND DEFENSIVE FORCES ~2,050

http://thebulletin.metapress.com ... 137734/fulltext.pdf
liudao 发表于 2009-8-24 12:35 | 显示全部楼层
冷战结束快20年了,俄罗斯都衰成这样了,就为了一点破核武器,美国还在逼它,呵呵。1964年以来我国发展核武器的战略看来正确之极。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-10-14 17:09 | 显示全部楼层
俄外长:俄美削减进攻性战略武器谈判出现实质性进展

俄新网RUSNEWS.CN莫斯科10月13日电 俄罗斯与美国在讨论新的削减进攻性战略武器条约方面有了实质性的进展,并商定尽一切力量使该工作在计划期限内完成。这是俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫13日在莫斯科结束与美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿谈判后的新闻发布会上做出的表示。

拉夫罗夫说:“我们有了实质性的进展。”

他指出,双方讨论了“仍需协调和进一步研究的问题,并商定尽一切力量使该工作在计划期限内完成,即在今年12月”。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-10-14 17:10 | 显示全部楼层
Will Russia's numbers decline without START follow-on?

With the new START treaty negotiations moving forward - the treaty will be discussed during Hillary Clinton's visit to Moscow that begins today - the opposition to the treaty is also shaping up. A couple of weeks ago the Senate Republican Policy Committee circulated a memo START Follow-on Dos & Don’ts (via The Cable), which provided a good look at the arguments that will certainly be used during the ratification process in the Senate.

Here is what the memo has to say about Russia:

The United States should not pay for what is free. Russia’s nuclear numbers will decline dramatically in the coming years with or without an arms control treaty. The United States should not make important concessions in return for something that will happen in any event.

Russia needs this agreement far more than the U.S. does. It is desperately trying to lock the U.S. into lower nuclear levels, not the other way around.
This line of thinking is hardly new - "decline" always adds some drama to the description of the reductions of the Russian arsenals and it begs for some dramatic adjective ("dramatic"?). Moreover, there is some evidence that seems to support the notion of decline - the numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery systems are indeed down substantially from what it was five or ten years ago.

However, the key point of the statement - that the numbers "will decline dramatically" with or without the treaty - is wrong. Neither it is true that Russia is desperate to have the new agreement - there are plenty of people in Russia who would be quite happy without it.

Yes, the numbers do suggest that Russia is moving toward a force of about 400 launchers and 1500-1700 nuclear warheads in the next 10-15 years. These numbers, however, assumed that Russia will be under some pressure to keep the numbers around the level of 1500 warheads. There are many reasons why I think it was a reasonable assumption - mostly it is the inertia of long-term plans made in the late 1990s and a general political commitment to nuclear disarmament that exists in Russia at least on the rhetorical level. Certainly, the plans made in the 1990s had to accept the economic realities of the time, but even in the fatter years after 2000 the plans didn't change very much - there has always been a general understanding that it is natural for the number of nuclear warheads to go down, not up.

Should the START process fail, this understanding will certainly take a hit, changing the landscape of Russia's strategic modernization. Of course, we are not talking about going back to the Cold War levels, but the "dramatic decline" would probably stop at the number that is not much lower than about 2500 operationally deployed warheads that Russia has today.

Land-based missiles

One obvious way to keep the number of warheads up is to deploy multiple warheads on single-warhead missiles. As we know, Russia has been preparing to do just that - the RS-24 missile is a MIRVed version of Topol-M that would carry "no fewer than four" warheads. This, however, has already been taken into account in my projections, so it won't change the numbers very much. Even if Russia would retrofit all its 65 currently deployed single-warhead Topol-M missiles with MIRVs, it will increase the overall number of warheads by about 150 - not very much to reverse the "dramatic decline".

However, MIRVing of Topol-M is not the only option out there. With no pressure to reduce its forces, Russia could consider keeping its UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 missiles. The currently deployed missiles of this type are about 30 years old - and are being removed from service (even thought their service life was extended to 33 years recently). But Russia is believed to have about 30 dry UR-100NUTTH missiles, which it could deploy. In fact, everything seems to be ready for that - in November 2008 President Medvedev stopped liquidation of a missile division in Kozelsk, which is where these missiles could be based. Since each is carrying six warheads, this would add another 180 nuclear weapons to the Russian arsenal.

Furthermore, the industry would not mind resuming production of missiles of the UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 class. NPOmash, the design bureau that produced the missile in the 1970s, does not hide it that it would like to be back in business with a new MIRVed missile of the SS-19 class (it would have to be a new missile, for some components of UR-100NUTTH, namely the guidance, were produced in Ukraine). One can imagine that in a situation with no particular constrains on strategic forces, NPOmash might eventually get that contract.

The silos in Kozelsk are not the only ones that would be available for deployment of new MIRVed missiles - Russia has been keeping some of its SS-18 silos intact - there are 24 empty silos in Uzhur and 21 - in Dombarovsky. It is hard to tell what are the plans regarding these silos, but they certainly would give Russia an option to add some ICBMs to its force - a silo is one of the most expensive part of a missile system.

Overall, if the current plan (which includes MIRVing of some Topol-Ms) has the Russian ICBM force with about 500 warheads in 2015-2025, this could be relatively easily boosted to about 800 and, with some effort, quite a bit higher.

Strategic submarines

The strategic fleet modernization program is currently getting the biggest share of Russia's military spending. And while the attention is mostly on the problems of the Bulava missile test program, the Russian Navy has a few other things to show for all this money - four out of six submarines of the Project 667BRDM/Delta IV class have completed overhaul already and the two remaining ones are expected to return to the active force in 2009 and in 2010-2011. These submarines will carry R-29RM Sineva missiles - it is an old design, but the missiles are newly manufactured.

These submarines and missiles could probably stay in service for quite some time - I would guess that the 2015-2020 time horizon is not out of question. Their predecessors, Project 667BDR/Delta III submarines, built about 30 years ago, are still very much alive.

If Russia is constrained by an arms control treaty, one could assume that when the new Project 955 subs with Bulava missiles will start entering service they will be replacing old Project 667BDRM submarines. In this the scenario, which I used in my projections, the number of SLBM warheads would go up a bit - to about 740 from the current 670.

But without constraints of an arms control treaty, the Navy would probably try to keep the recently refurbished Project 667BDRM/Delta IV in force for as long as they can. For example, instead of keeping a total of eight submarines in service, retiring one Project 667BDRM submarine every time a new Project 955 sub enters service, the Navy could keep ten, adding 32 launchers and 128 warheads to the SLBM force. Admittedly, this is not much, but these things add up - the number of SLBM warheads would grow to just under 900.

Strategic bombers

Changes in this leg of the triad are quite unlikely, but not entirely impossible. The currently deployed bombers, Tu-160 and Tu-95MS, are relatively new - most were built in the mid- to late-1980s. They are undergoing overhaul and will probably stay in service for a long time. According to the START treaty rules, the bombers are capable of carrying 844 ALCMs. The actual number of weapons associated with the bomber force is probably smaller, but we could assume that if no arms control restrictions are in place, Russia could easily keep a bomber force equipped with about 800 nuclear weapons.

Given a chance, the military and the industry would definitely be pushing for expansion of the bomber force - the Air Force would not mind having a new Tu-160 aircraft every year or two, so it could bring the total to 30 by 2025-2030.

So, what do you get for free?

It is a good rule of thumb that generally you get what you pay for. What the United States will get "for free" is not a "dramatic decline of Russia's nuclear numbers", but something more like a Russia's force of about 2400-2500 warheads. The number might be adjusted somewhat to meet the Moscow treaty requirement - 2200 warheads by 2012, but it could easily go up after that. None of that would be transparent - Russia would be quite happy to part with all those START reporting and verification.

It is quite possible that this is the outcome that the authors of the Republican memo would like to see - I can easily see how, once the arms control process is broken, its authors will be complaining about  "unconstrained growth" of the same Russia's nuclear numbers they say are in "dramatic decline" today. We've seen that before.

Some in the United States may still decide that the difference between a Russian strategic force of 1500 or 2500 nuclear warheads is not significant enough to be worth the price of a treaty that would constrain U.S. programs. There is half a point here - the numbers don't really matter. At this point the real benefit of the arms control process is in cooperation, trust- and confidence-building, and better communication that creates an environment that allows working on a much broader set of security issues than simple cold-war style bean-counting. We know that these things don't come for free - the Bush administration tried that.

[Arms control] [Aviation] [Navy] [Rocket Forces] [Strategic forces] [October 13, 2009]

http://russianforces.org/blog/20 ... mbers_decline.shtml
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-10-17 19:34 | 显示全部楼层
美国首次表明截至2012年核弹头削减目标

美国政府代表15日在联合国大会第一委员会发表演讲,称经过此前在核裁军方面的努力,美国的核弹头数量“截至2012年将减少到2001年时的一半、1990年的四分之一,届时将降至(冷战时期)上世纪50年代之后最低水平”。预计2012年美国的核弹头数量约为5千个。

  据日本共同社报道,这是将核裁军作为国际承诺的奥巴马政府首次明确包括备用核弹头在内的削减计划。但关于2012年之后的未来削减计划,该代表仅表示将“力争”在美俄核裁军谈判中达成协议。

  作为提出“无核武世界”构想的奥巴马政府,其在联合国提出具体削减目标之举目的可能是敦促其他持核国家做出进一步努力。美国代表强调,“美国至今加快了核弹头削减步速度”。他还强调,美国已经实现了原计划于2012年实现的可部署型库存导弹头削减目标,并正在努力将这一目标值再削减15%。

  据美国权威智库“美国自然资源保护委员会”(NRDC)透露,美国在1990年、2001年以及2006年时的核弹头数量分别为21682个、10907个和10400个。
shaolin1254 发表于 2009-10-17 22:03 | 显示全部楼层
销毁后的核弹头怎么处理?这个成关键了
snowtiger 发表于 2009-10-17 23:07 | 显示全部楼层
铀参杂降低浓度给核电站用。钚一般扔进反应堆靠中子冲击给嬗变掉。一般反应堆中子通量小,嬗变处理时间长。高中子通量的快堆干这个正好。不仅处理掉了钚,还能顺便输出能量。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-10-17 23:15 | 显示全部楼层
卖给爱好和平的中国人民吧,价钱好商量
shaolin1254 发表于 2009-10-17 23:50 | 显示全部楼层
卖给爱好和平的中国人民吧,价钱好商量
kktt 发表于 2009-10-17 23:15

这个方法好
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-10-19 16:59 | 显示全部楼层
俄总统:俄方尽全力使削减战略武器新条约在12月签署

俄新网RUSNEWS.CN莫斯科10月19日电 俄罗斯目前正尽全力争取与美国在12月签署削减和限制进攻性战略武器新条约。这是俄罗斯总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫在19日作出的表示,他将于次日访问贝尔格莱德。

梅德韦杰夫在塞尔维亚报纸《晚间新闻》19日刊登的采访中说:“目前在日内瓦刚好正在对制定新的俄美之间就削减和限制进攻性战略武器达成一致的法律基础进行谈判,并且将对此进行确定。我们正在尽一切努力使相关文件在12月签署。”

据他称,俄罗斯在考虑保留"为保障俄罗斯国家及盟友安全所必需的最低限度的"核武器的同时,认为有必要同美国保持力量平衡。

梅德韦杰夫指出,莫斯科曾多次声明,已作好准备“将进攻性战略武器运载工具的数量减少至原来的1/3”。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-10-20 18:00 | 显示全部楼层
【美国《华盛顿邮报》10月17日报道】题:国会批准研制核炸弹
美国参众两院批准了重建战术核武器的第一步方案,以便这种武器能在21世纪进入武器库。
根据本周公布的一份关干2010财政年度能源和水领域的拨款议案,议员们同意明年拨款3250万美元,用于B61-12战术核炸弹非核部分的可行性研究、设计。该议案还包括用于美国核计划的部分资金。
重新制造战术核炸弹一事,已经促使一些议员和反核人士提出如下问题:这是否要制造一种新的核武器。
议员们明确表示,未经参众两院拨款委员会的批准,任何经费都不得用于战术核炸弹核部分的研究。
经国会授权,五角大楼正在研究制定奥巴马政府的核武器政策,其中涉及未来所需核武器的数量。这项被称作“核态势研究”的报告,可望在今年年底或明年年初完成。与会者在他们的报告中说,在审议之后,国家科学院将针对B61系列战术核炸弹对核恐怖主义以及其他形式的军事威胁的威慑作用作出评估。
B61系列战术核炸弹最早于1966年问世,随着不断有新的改进型炸弹推出,其数量在上世纪70年代不断增加。2000年, B61-7战术核炸弹和B61-11战术核炸弹再度得到改迸,以使其寿命延长20年。
snowtiger 发表于 2009-10-20 19:00 | 显示全部楼层
中子弹?!一般裂变弹没啥搞头了吧。。。
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