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[核武器] 美俄核裁军专题

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 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-10-20 19:37 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 kktt 于 2009-10-20 19:42 编辑

http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008_9_26.html#B8705677

U.S. Air Force Might Modify Nuclear Bomb
By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — For the first time in more than a decade, the U.S. Air Force is studying the option of adding significant new features to one of its aging atomic bombs, according to a senior service official (see GSN, Sept. 12).

The proposed modifications to the B-61 gravity bomb — which service officials are dubbing the “B-61 Mod 12” — would exceed the extent of parts repair or replacement typically performed to increase a weapon’s service life.

The new plans would infuse the bomb — originally designed and built in the 1960s — with state-of-the-art capabilities to reduce the risk of theft and prevent an accidental detonation, the senior Air Force official said in a Sept. 10 interview.  The official asked not to be identified because of sensitivities associated with discussing the attributes of U.S. nuclear weapons.

The initiative would also lend the weapons another 20 to 30 years of service life, a service spokesman said.

Yet the inclusion of a large array of upgrades in the overhaul could raise hackles on Capitol Hill, where lawmakers have strongly opposed anything that appears to be a “new” nuclear weapon.

Beginning with an initial design investment of roughly $120 million over the next two years, the Mod 12 would eventually replace all but the very newest versions of the B-61, the official said.

As many as 920 B-61 Mods 3, 4 and 7 could undergo the upgrades beginning as early as 2015, though the figures could decline if the arsenal shrinks in the coming years, the official said.  An estimated 35 B-61 Mod 11s remaining in the force are modern enough that they would not have to undergo the refurbishment.

The move comes in response to congressional rejection of Bush administration efforts to develop a new nuclear warhead to modernize the entire U.S. arsenal.  For the second year in a row, Capitol Hill has zeroed funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, touted as offering increased reliability, maintainability, safety and security relative to today’s stockpile (see GSN, July 10).

Lawmakers have demanded that the government show how such a new weapon would fit into its overarching nuclear strategy before they would consider funding.

One key sticking point has been concern about building a new nuclear warhead at a time when the United States is spearheading efforts to discourage proliferation around the globe.  Another worry is that the Energy Department might need to test the design through underground explosions, despite a U.S. moratorium in place for more than a decade.

“It’s dead under this administration, that’s pretty clear,” the senior service official said of the Reliable Replacement Warhead.  “Let’s see what happens in a new administration.  But it’s not going to come out of this one.”

Both presidential candidates have left open the possibility of developing a new nuclear warhead, while still expressing a degree of caution.  Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.) has said he does not support “a premature decision to produce” the weapon, while Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) has said he would support only a warhead “that is absolutely essential for the viability of our deterrent” and helps facilitate force reductions.

A Demand for ‘Real Estate’
Air Force interest in an expanded upgrade effort aligns with a new approach laid out recently by U.S. Strategic Command, under which some of the advanced technologies previously imagined for the Reliable Replacement Warhead might now be retrofitted into existing weapons as they undergo maintenance.  The idea would be to fulfill as many RRW objectives as possible without a wholesale replacement of the warhead.

The Energy Department’s semiautonomous nuclear weapons agency has said that short of building a new Reliable Replacement Warhead, it is already incorporating all the safety and security features it can into existing weapons in the stockpile via ongoing Life-Extension Programs.

The National Nuclear Security Administration view reflects size and yield constraints on the current array of weapons in the U.S. stockpile, according to experts.  However, if the Pentagon could either increase the size of a given weapon system or reduce its explosive yield, additional safety and security features imagined for the replacement warhead might instead be incorporated into existing hardware as it is overhauled, the Air Force official said.

“It’s that sort of thing that really allows you to get into this design space, that gives you a little more margin, without testing,” Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, said in a telephone interview this week.

While declining to describe specific safety and security upgrades under contemplation, the Air Force representative said they are modifications that “we know how to do, but they take ‘real estate’ [inside the weapon package].  They take volume.  They take weight and mass.”

The official explained that desired security features would improve on “permissive action links” that for years have served as “a lock on the door” of each nuclear warhead, the official said.  Little public information is available about how such security devices work, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes them as mechanisms “in or attached to a nuclear weapon system to preclude arming and/or launching until the insertion of a prescribed discrete code or combination.”

Amid growing concern about potential workarounds that might allow unauthorized access to a weapon, older permissive action links should be upgraded or replaced by the latest tools, the Air Force official argued.  More modern devices might effectively neutralize the weapon upon any intrusion, this and other defense officials have said.

Moving to ‘Plan B’
The service has received initial indications that Capitol Hill might be amenable to altering the B-61’s size to allow for RRW-like improvements.  However, legislators still might find it difficult to accept that the initiative remains within the bounds of a traditional Life-Extension Program, the official acknowledged.

“If you can put it in a bigger case, some people in the past thought that was not an LEP,” the official said.  It is even less clear whether lawmakers would allow a change in yield, the official said.

“We are in discussions with staffers on the Hill on that, [having] talked to some of the people on the authorization committees very recently,” said the senior official.  The service also planned to consult with the House and Senate appropriations committees “in the very near future,” the official added.

“Initial feedback” has been that lawmakers might “allow some exploration in more volume [or to] change the shape” of the B-61, if that would open up space for additional safety and security features, the official said.  However, in keeping with congressional mandates against creating a new atomic weapon, legislators want to preserve “the same military capabilities” that the B-61 currently has, the official said.

The Energy Department’s nuclear weapons arm is wrapping up a limited life-extension effort for two variants of the B-61 — the Mod 7 and Mod 11 — that can be delivered by strategic bomber aircraft.  John Broehm, an NNSA spokesman, said his organization would complete the refurbishment by the end of fiscal 2009.

The Air Force told the National Nuclear Security Administration “about a year ago” that it wanted to study expanding the scope of the B-61 life extension effort, given early congressional resistance to the replacement warhead idea, the service official said.

The study is scheduled to begin as of the new fiscal year next month.  Depending on its results, the Air Force might offer the nuclear agency more detailed guidance on how much new room would be available on the bomb to include additional features.

“Say we can still meet the same mission … and we get agreement from the Hill that [we can] grow the case by, say — just to pull a number — an inch in diameter, and could add, say, 500 pounds of weight to the bomb,” the Air Force official said.  “[If] we show them it’s the same mission set, and that’s still a B-61 Mod 12, then they can do so much more.”

The Air Force defines a “mod” as a change to a weapon that reflects new or different performance standards, such as explosive power or destructive capability against reinforced targets.  Smaller changes, called “alterations,” replace a part or subsystem but do not involve a change in performance.  Life-extension efforts typically constitute only an alteration.

The first weapon the RRW program was to replace was the Navy’s W-76 warhead.  The initial concept for the B-61 Mod 12 grew out of plans for an RRW-2 weapon – a provenance that might not sit well with lawmakers who have opposed the replacement warhead.

The RRW-2 variant was to replace not only the B-61s but all air-delivered nuclear warheads, including cruise missiles, the official said.

“Remember, this is the second year in a row” that Congress has cut the replacement warhead from the administration’s budget, the official told GSN.  “[The] B-61’s getting kind of long in the tooth.  So a Mod 12 was always our backup if RRW did not go forward.”

When House and Senate appropriators opted this year to deny funding again, “that was not a surprise,” said the official.  For the Air Force, “it was, ‘OK, Plan B:  Mod 12.’”

An Initial Look
While a boost in the B-61’s casing might be more politically palatable, the upcoming life-extension study is also expected to assess how a decrease in yield might be traded for additional safety and security features, the senior service official said.

The service must assess whether a B-61 with less of an explosive punch would remain capable enough to reliably destroy the same targets as it could today, the official said.

Would the Air Force be able to “hold the same targets at risk?” asked the official, in describing performance alternatives the design study would consider.  “What’s the same?  What can be allowed to change?”

The roughly $120 million required for the two-year assessment would likely come from an $80.4 million catch-all line item for “B-61 Stockpile Systems” in the fiscal 2009 NNSA budget, along with a projected $111.3 million for B-61 efforts in fiscal 2010.

Between 2010 and 2013, NNSA officials, “in coordination with the DOD, will initiate a new LEP for the B-61 while researching, developing, and producing required weapon upgrades/modifications,” according to budget documents the nuclear organization provided to Congress this year.

The cost to actually undertake the B-61 life extension is unknown at this point, and “really depends upon what you put in,” said the Air Force official.  Cost estimates also vary depending on how many bombs would be upgraded.

A Nuclear Posture Review that the incoming presidential administration is expected to launch next year could lead to changes in the size of the U.S. arsenal.  In turn, that could affect the quantity of B-61s undergoing life extension, the official said.

“The beauty of the timing here, though, is the engineering study needs to go on no matter whether you build 10 or 300 or 500,” the official said.  “So while the NPR’s going on and we’re deciding that path forward for the next administration, we still do that [B-61 design] work in parallel.”

Ultimately all of the Air Force and Navy nuclear warheads would undergo life extension, absent a warhead-replacement program, a senior Strategic Command official said in an interview last month.

After initiating the B-61 bomb project, the weapon next up for Air Force life extension would be the Minuteman 3 ICBM’s W-78 warhead.  To improve that weapon’s safety and security components, the Air Force would have fewer options compared to the gravity bomb.

Warheads customized for ballistic or cruise missiles cannot grow in size to accommodate additional features because they must continue to fit on their delivery platforms, the Air Force official noted.  There is more latitude to change the size or shape of a gravity bomb, which is delivered from bomber or attack aircraft.

“You can gain some [room] with modern electronics.  They’re more compact than what we used in the ’70s,” the service official said.  “And if that’s not enough [for the W-78 modernization], then you need to get a smaller physics package, which makes a smaller yield.”

The “physics package” includes all the explosive components of the warhead, so reducing its size to allow for the addition of other features would result in a less powerful weapon.

Along with the Energy Department, the Air Force is drafting a “Joint Life Extension Study” to lay out when each warhead in its stockpile should be modernized.  The organizations launched the study over the past year and expect to complete it in fiscal 2009, the official said.

What Constitutes ‘New’?
For the near term, as the Air Force crafts a more ambitious life-extension effort for the gravity bomb, it could run afoul of congressional efforts to block a new nuclear weapon, according to Jeffrey Lewis, head of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation.

However, Lewis said he would “not necessarily [be] opposed to an LEP approach” if it could offer safety or security benefits, short of building a new warhead.

“We don’t know how far you can press the LEP program,” said Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists.  “Can you press it so far that it constitutes a new weapon?”

The Air Force official said that while the proposed changes would exceed a typical life extension, they would not require building a new “pit,” the atomic core of a weapon.  By contrast, officials planned on a new pit for the Reliable Replacement Warhead.

That distinction, combined with the widely supported objective of increasing nuclear weapons safety and security, might ultimately garner congressional support for the effort, according to several Washington insiders.

“If you can combine the best features of an RRW program” with a refurbishment of the existing stockpile, “then you’ve potentially got a more marketable product” on Capitol Hill, a House aide said last week.

To the extent that a B-61 Life-Extension Program “can incorporate more safety and security functions … that would be a good idea,” Kristensen said.  “Nobody is against that.”

He added, though, that Capitol Hill should ensure that safety and security risks to U.S. nuclear warheads are assessed realistically so that the cost to modify the weapons remains reasonable.

“The question is:  Who sets the requirement for how much safety is necessary?” said Kristensen, who directs his organization’s Nuclear Information Project.

Similarly, without rigorous oversight, escalating concerns about the potential for nuclear terrorism could mean that virtually “anyone who comes around with new security features will get the go-ahead” to produce such components, he said.

Other thorny issues that first arose with the replacement warhead could also dog the new administration next year if it embraces the life-extension concept, several analysts noted.  Among the questions raised would be whether warheads undergoing an expanded life extension could continue to be certified as reliable without explosive testing, the House aide said.

Hecker, the former Los Alamos lab director, advocates undertaking detailed studies and prototypes prior to any ambitious LEP overhauls, to prove the designs would be dependable without underground tests.

“If you can’t do it without testing, you can’t do it,” said Hecker, now a scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Expanded life-extension efforts “take you through as many questions as you had” with the Reliable Replacement Warhead, a program he supported, he said.

The Strategic Command official interviewed last month voiced confidence that additional life-extension measures could be implemented without a need to break a U.S. test moratorium in place since the early 1990s.

“I can test the fuses, I can test the high explosives that are in there, I can test a lot of the pieces.  I can test all those both independently and [integrated] all the way to short of a [nuclear explosive] test,” the senior command official said.  “So I can tell you everything in the weapon short of nuclear explosion happens in the way we predict it to happen.  We do that still today with the current weapons.”

Another lingering uncertainty, even after an expanded life-extension effort is complete, is whether today’s sizable stockpile of backup warheads would still be needed as a “hedge” against potential technical failures, the House aide noted.

The administration this week reaffirmed that, absent an RRW program, an unspecified number of warheads above a future 2,200 limit on operationally deployed weapons must be retained, in part to mitigate the risk of discovering any malfunctions in the aging arsenal (see GSN, Sept. 24).  It is unclear if the emerging plans for life extension might alter that calculus.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-10-20 19:44 | 显示全部楼层
Conferees Approve Study of Nuclear Bomb
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, October 17, 2009

The first step toward rebuilding one of the nation's tactical nuclear weapons so it could be put in the stockpile well into the 21st century has been approved by House and Senate conferees.

The lawmakers permitted $32.5 million to be spent next year on feasibility, design and cost studies for the non-nuclear components of the B61-12 tactical nuclear bomb, according to their report released this week on the fiscal 2010 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill. The measure contains funds for the nation's nuclear weapons programs.

The rebuilding of the bomb has raised caused some members of Congress and anti-nuclear activists to question whether a new nuclear weapon is being assembled.

The Obama administration did not seek funds for studying the nuclear components of the B61-12, and the conferees made clear that no money could be spent for such a task without approval from the House and Senate Appropriations panels.

The Pentagon is midway through a congressionally mandated review to establish the Obama administration's nuclear weapons policies, including the number of weapons needed in the future. Called the Nuclear Posture Review, it is expected to be completed by the end of this year or early next year. The conferees said in their report that after that review, the National Academy of Sciences would look at the deterrence value of the B61 against nuclear terrorism and other military threats, and that the independent JASON Defense Advisory Group would determine whether the B61-12 can be considered reliable without nuclear testing.

The Bush administration had looked at replacing the current stockpile of high-yield nuclear warheads with new, longer-lasting and more secure weapons. One candidate was a new version of the B61.

Focus has also been on the B61 because it is the nuclear weapon currently deployed in Europe for use by NATO, and must either complete refurbishing or be rebuilt, as is being considered. In a speech last month, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said the Nuclear Posture Review "in one or two cases" will "probably [recommend] new designs" for nuclear weapons "that will be safer and more reliable."

The B61 was first produced in 1966, with the number increasing in the 1970s as new modifications were introduced. In 2000, models of the B61-7 and B61-11 were put into refurbishment programs to extend their lives for 20 years.

In their report, the conferees approved $9.9 billion for next year's operation of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which runs the nuclear weapons program within the Energy Department.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-11-2 17:25 | 显示全部楼层
俄美核裁军谈判进入“冲刺阶段” 双方各怀鬼胎

    随着12月5日的临近,俄美削减进攻性战略武器新条约的谈判进入了“冲刺阶段”。

    日前,俄外长拉夫罗夫证实,俄美两国总统将在11月14日利用共同出席亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议之机再次举行会谈,而会谈的核心主题自然就是削减进攻性战略武器新条约问题。拉夫罗夫称,两国总统届时将听取新条约谈判进程的详细汇报,并再次就谈判中的难点问题共同作出“政治决定”。许多分析人士指出,俄美能否如期签署削减进攻性战略武器新条约,成败在此一谈。而这一新条约又将是俄美关系重启的“试金石”。俄美关系是“光开花不结果”,还是“既开花又结果”,就看这个新条约了。

    为就新条约相关问题进一步加强高层磋商,美国总统国家安全事务助理琼斯于10月28日至29日率领一支由美国国防部副部长、美国负责核裁军的副国务卿、美国总统核裁军问题特别代表等人组成的美方代表团对俄罗斯进行了正式工作访问,并与拉夫罗夫就起草削减进攻性战略武器新条约等问题进行了磋商。在莫斯科期间,琼斯除与拉夫罗夫举行两次会谈外,还分别与俄国家安全会议秘书帕特鲁舍夫、俄总统外事助理普里霍季科举行了会谈,而这些会谈的主要议题就是俄美削减进攻性战略武器新条约的谈判拟定进程、伊核和阿富汗局势问题。

    10月29日,俄外长拉夫罗夫在会见琼斯后强调:“美国总统国家安全事务助理琼斯对俄罗斯的访问及时得不能再及时了。”他表示,俄美双方只有“最大限度地加紧工作”,两国谈判代表团才能按期完成俄美总统今年7月会见时下达的“限时任务”,即尽一切努力在现行条约于2009年12月5日到期前成功签署新的削减进攻性战略武器条约。

    据知情者称,琼斯此行还向俄方转交了一份详细的建议清单。虽然美俄双方均拒绝透露这一清单的详细情况,但用拉夫罗夫的话说就是:“这份建议清单证明了双方在谈判进程中的进展。”一位参与俄美核裁军谈判的俄方人士对记者称:“鉴于核裁军问题对俄美双方的敏感性,在新条约最终签署之前,双方都完全有必要保持绝对的低调,以免让谈判进程节外生枝,使双方陷入被动。”

    目前,俄美新条约谈判的主要难点是核弹头运载工具的削减幅度、进攻性与防御性武器“挂钩”问题、“奥巴马版”新反导计划的真实情况等。俄主张对运载工具进行大幅度削减,双方将运载工具的数量削减至500枚。而美则不同意如此之大的削减幅度,只同意把运载工具的数量控制在1100枚,这其实就是目前五角大楼实战部署的运载工具的额度。

    据10月29日参与拉夫罗夫与琼斯谈判的一位不愿意透露姓名的人士对记者透露:“这两个难点在这次谈判中均被成功解决,但俄方还有一系列关切尚未完全消除,这就需要双方的进一步谈判。”对此,拉夫罗夫对记者强调:“谈判仍在继续。不过,我坚信,在新条约中肯定有关于进攻性与防御性武器关联性的表述。请你们相信我!”

    俄一位接近克里姆林宫的人士日前若有所指地说:“美国人希望,当奥巴马接过诺贝尔和平奖时,美俄削减进攻性战略武器新条约已签署了。对此,我们并不反对。”此间分析人士指出,实际上,俄美双方能否赶在2009年12月5日前签署新条约不仅是两国关系“重启”的试金石,而且还将直接影响到奥巴马12月10日出席诺贝尔和平奖颁奖仪式的公众形象。如果奥巴马能够怀揣着美俄削减进攻性战略武器新条约去领诺贝尔和平奖,那还多少有一些“名副其实”的味道,否则的话,奥巴马除了一堆口头建议还真没什么可以与这个和平奖交换的。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-11-9 19:27 | 显示全部楼层
俄媒:美国拟在核弹运载工具数量上向俄让步

据俄罗斯《独立报》报道,11月9日俄罗斯和美国将在日内瓦展开新一轮谈判,磋商起草削减进攻性战略武器的新条约。双方希望能在今年年底前签署新协议,根据奥巴马政府透露出的消息,美国准备在核弹运载工具数量和核查程序这两项关键分歧上向俄方做出让步。

  据美国较有影响的《华盛顿邮报》11月8日披露,俄美削减进攻性战略武器新条约的谈判本周可能取得突破,上周末莫斯科同样发出了乐观信号。俄总统梅德韦杰夫在接受德国媒体采访时宣布,俄美双方完全有机会在今年年底前在新条约谈判上达成一致,确定新的核武器门槛和相互监督核查措施,签署具有法律约束力的文件。俄外交部官方发言人涅斯捷连科表示,俄方希望此次谈判成为最后一轮谈判,双方能在12月5日之前签署新条约。

  目前的乐观情绪是由美国总统国家安全事务助理琼斯不久前访问莫斯科时引发的,当时他为克里姆林宫带来了美方就削减进攻性战略武器新条约谈判的一揽子建议,特别是建议双方在关键分歧,即战略运载工具最大数量上进行“理智的妥协”。今年7月俄美总统在莫斯科会晤时确定战略武器运载工具(战略轰炸机、海基和陆基洲际弹道导弹)的数量限度为500到1100件,俄罗斯坚持下限,美国坚持上限。现在美国权威媒体首次披露“理智妥协”的数字为700件,不过这暂时还只是一个建议。如果算上装备常规弹头而非核弹头的战略导弹数量的话,美国谈判代表可能会最终同意俄罗斯的要求。

  俄罗斯科学院美国和加拿大研究所所长谢尔盖-罗戈夫认为,《华盛顿邮报》的相关报道内容是美国政府有意泄露给公众的对自己有益的信息。他说:“我认为,美国人明白,他们必须做出一定的让步。报道说到,美国可能同意把战略核弹头运载工具的数量由1100件减少到700件,而俄罗斯的立场是500件。我认为,如果美方同意(减少到)700件,达成妥协的可能性是完全现实的。”

  俄罗斯专家指出,如果保持1100件战略武器运载工具的数量水平,一旦需要美国人完全可能在半年到一年时间内在自己现役导弹上再多装配3000枚标准弹头,这种复原潜力的问题引起了俄罗斯的特别关注。罗戈夫说:“如果双方成功达成700件运载工具的协议,美国人仍然有相当大的复原潜力,但是其规模已经不如先前那样庞大。预计美方还将被迫同意把五角大楼希望装配到战略导弹上的常规弹头也列入到核弹头数量上。美国则将努力迫使俄罗斯同意美军4艘‘俄亥俄’级核潜艇脱离条约框架,这些核潜艇此前携带的‘三叉戟’弹道导弹已被更换为巡航导弹。根据《第一阶段削减进攻性战略武器条约》的规定,这些潜艇尽管改装了非核弹药,仍被列为核武器运载工具。妥协可能以这种方式进行:美国人同意算上自己战略导弹上的常规弹头,而我们则同意他们配备巡航导弹的潜艇仍在条约框架之外。”

  罗戈夫指出,俄美双方在核武器谈判中还有其他相当多的分歧,特别是有关核查场所的问题。俄方认为,根据《第一阶段削减进攻性战略武器条约》的规定,现在仍在俄境内监督沃特金斯克洲际弹道导弹制造厂的美国检查人员应当在12月5日之后离开,而美国人却想继续保留对该工厂的核查。作为让步,美国参议院共和党议员卢格11月5日提出一项议案,建议在互惠基础上,授权美国总统允许俄罗斯核查人员前往美国。美方希望建立某种桥梁机制,以使在旧条约到期后新条约生效前,美俄双方仍可互相通报有关核试验、核武器转运方面的相关信息。
liudao 发表于 2009-11-9 23:51 | 显示全部楼层
不对核裁军具体表态,奥黑下个月怎么去领炸药奖?
本周的新加坡APEC会议,看看他的嘴皮子功夫到底如何。
JK-SETI 发表于 2009-12-5 19:42 | 显示全部楼层
《第一阶段削减进攻性战略武器条约》终于到期失效了。
从里根时代开始,这个条约就是整个军控界的话题;从限制到削减,实在是当时不敢想象的进步。
SALT II没成, START II也没成, START III在2000年NPT大会上还能有些响声,现在还有几人知道它?
如果说感谢具体个人,就是戈尔巴乔夫和奥巴马。
希望后续条约能承前启后,但是总觉得它已经变成纯粹的信心建立措施了(从怕死到怕花钱,也算是核武器作用的下降吧)。
shaolin1254 发表于 2009-12-5 21:26 | 显示全部楼层
这东西和奥巴马有啥关系
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2009-12-5 21:38 | 显示全部楼层
奥巴马有可能要改变美国现行的核战略,这是大幅度削减核武器的前提。等着看NPR2010吧。
JK-SETI 发表于 2009-12-5 22:08 | 显示全部楼层
没有奥巴马,START I就不是在今年失效,而是早就失效了。

“改变美国现行的核战略”这个大了点,“打击军事力量”的能力是不能被撤销的,因为美国的硬件仍然存在,先发制人的能力无法用政治命令撤销。
值得期待的是宣告“不首先使用”和不造RRW。
其他估计一切照旧。
而且现在看来NPR中出现这些变化的前景不乐观,很可能就是撤销当年布什时代“威胁对若干国使用核弹”的章节而已。
shaolin1254 发表于 2009-12-5 23:58 | 显示全部楼层
俺对奥巴马能改变美国现有核战略表示悲观。
东方红 发表于 2009-12-6 11:13 | 显示全部楼层
核战略主要取决于国家实力与国际环境,现在就算没有核裁军条约,俄罗斯核武器照样会减少,美国核武器也不会增加。核裁军本身就是因地制宜的作秀而已,将希望寄托在某个国家领导人身上未免幼稚了点。