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[核武器] 美俄核裁军专题

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东方红 发表于 2010-3-28 14:28 | 显示全部楼层
国际观察:透视美俄新核裁军协议
来源:新华网 2010年03月27日

  美国总统奥巴马26日宣布,美国和俄罗斯已经就新的核裁军协议达成一致,这一新条约将替代已于去年底到期的《削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》。他透露,除了明确削减核弹头数量之外,新条约还建立了“有效的”核实机制。
  舆论认为,协议的达成对于美俄增进战略互信并在《不扩散核武器条约》框架下共同推动全球范围内的核裁军进程具有一定的积极意义,但鉴于两国仍然拥有规模庞大的核武器,并且在诸如美国反导系统等问题上存在尖锐分歧,该协议能否真正得到执行及其效果还有待观察。

  削减力度明显
  奥巴马当天透露,经过近1年的艰苦谈判,美国和俄罗斯两国政府终于就进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器达成新的协议,双方将于4月8日在捷克首都布拉格签署这一“近20年来最为全面的军控协议”。
  这一协议将取代已经于去年12月5日到期失效的《削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》,成为推动美俄核裁军进程的新机制。不难看出,新协议对美俄两国核武库的削减力度比较明显。根据协议,两国各自部署的核弹头数量将被削减至1550枚以下,而已部署战略武器运载工具数量将被削减至700件以下。美国方面称,与以往协议相比,新的协议还规定了操作性更强的核查措施,以确保美俄核裁军进程接受有力的监督。
  1991年7月,苏联与美国签署了《削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》,双方规定把各自拥有的核弹头削减至不超过6000枚,运载工具减至1600件以下。据俄媒体透露,截至2009年,美国拥有运载工具约900件,携带核弹头约3500枚(美方目前只承认拥有2200枚核弹头);俄罗斯拥有运载工具约680件,携带弹头约2800枚。
  美俄两国政府就进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器达成的协议一经签署,将分别被送至两国立法机构审议批准。协议生效后有效期为十年,双方可根据需要对其延长,每次延长期限为五年。

  美俄各有考虑
  奥巴马在当天的新闻发布会上说,美俄两国政府达成的新协议是向国际社会发出的一个“清晰信号”,即两国准备领导全球的核裁军进程。他说:“通过坚持自己在《不扩散核武器条约》中的承诺,我们加强了阻止这些武器扩散和确保其他国家担负起他们自己责任的全球努力。”
  核问题专家指出,促使印度、巴基斯坦、朝鲜、以色列等国加入《不扩散核武器条约》以接受国际监督,已经成为奥巴马政府全球核裁军政策的重要目标。
  美国布鲁金斯学会军控专家斯蒂文皮弗告诉新华社记者,新的削减战略核武器条约的达成让美国在4月12日至13日在华盛顿举行的核安全峰会和5月在纽约举行的《不扩散核武器条约》审议会议前“占得先机”。他说,“这一条约的好处就是,美国代表将拥有很多资本,可以要求其他国家克服政治障碍,采取措施加强核不扩散体系”。
  俄罗斯武装力量总参谋长马卡罗夫26日在莫斯科说,两国代表在谈判中确定了相互都可以接受的战略核武器的数量,明确了核裁军的监督机制,规定了进攻性战略武器和防御性武器之间的联系。他表示,所达成的协议消除了彼此的担忧,完全符合俄罗斯的安全利益。俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫当天也在与奥巴马通电话时说,新的核裁军条约草案“体现了两国利益的平衡”。

  协议前景存疑
  目前,美俄两国拥有全球95%战略武器储备。即便按照新协议将核武库规模从目前的基础上“削减三分之一”,这两个国家战略武器数量仍占全球战略武器总量的90%以上。国际舆论认为,由于美俄仍拥有数量众多的核武器,实现“无核世界”的目标仍非常遥远。
  其次,美俄双方在美国导弹防御系统问题上存在尖锐分歧,新协议能否按计划得到执行尚有待观察。分析人士指出,今年以来一些东欧国家在反导问题上频频“刺激”俄罗斯,这在一定程度上延缓了新核裁军协议的签署时间,也让外界对该协议的前景充满疑虑。
  美国国防部长罗伯特盖茨明确表示,美国的导弹防御系统不受新核裁军协议的制约。对此,俄外交部长拉夫罗夫反唇相讥,称如果美方继续在欧洲部署这一系统,俄方“有权终止削减进攻性战略核武器”。
  此外,新协议要获批准,还至少需跨过美国国会这道“坎”。按照相关规定,协议需在100席的美国会参议院获得67席支持方可获得通过。分析人士指出,参议院内的保守派议员一直对继续削减战略核武器持有异议,而共和党议员则因在医疗改革问题上的失败而对奥巴马政府耿耿于怀,不能排除他们阻挠核裁军协议通过的可能,因此该协议能否在美国国会顺利获得通过还是个未知数。
JK-SETI 发表于 2010-3-28 20:09 | 显示全部楼层
START后续条约可能要叫布拉格条约,纪念奥巴马“无核世界”的演讲。
    现在看来,基本不会有什么削减。
    俄罗斯在最后一次START数据交换中,运载工具的数量就是809。布拉格条约“战略武器运载工具数量”是800,实际上考虑到今后退役、服役等等变更情况,俄罗斯的总运载工具数量可以说完全不变。
    美国资金相对充裕,所以运载工具数量大,START数据是1188件,有较大的回装潜力;所以布拉格条约这个“800”对美国才有一点“削减”的意思。
    但是要知道START的计数原则是只要有能力就算一件,如果考虑“实际部署”的数量,也就是莫斯科条约的限制,美国真正需要裁减的载具数量不会超过100件。
    不知道这100件运载工具的削减算不算“削减力度明显”。
    不过俄罗斯很可能还是回到“限制美国回装潜力”这个卖点上,向国内各势力推销布拉格条约,再考虑“俄方基本不用削减”这点,俄国接受“不限制反导”的可能性还是很大的。
    还有说法是俄国会发单边声明,如果美国反导系统威胁过大,将退出布拉格条约。
    目前看来,国内的评论都没有提到“运载工具总数”和“部署运载工具数量”的区别,前者是800件,后者是700件。目前的评论是美国可能会利用这一百枚的空间来放“维修中的SSBN”和“空发射井”。这也算是它“留一手”的成果。
    说“留一手”意思是:原来START每个载具上的弹头数不定,载具数确定;现在变成是每个载具上的弹头数确定,载具数有灵活机动的空间。保证了美国在必要时退出条约并迅速增大弹头数量的能力。
    于是综合来看,特别是“Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit”这句,可能说明要用实地核查来确定运载工具上的弹头数;也就是说不再用START的“最大试射弹头数”来算。
    到发射井实地核查这个概念谈了有30多年,如果真能在布拉格条约实现,倒也是提高透明度的新成就。
    其他方面对我来说都是不能让人满意的。
    战术核武器:没有限制,毕竟还是“START后续条约”
    非部署战略核弹头数:没有限制,于是还是会有人说“中国被两万枚核弹头包围”。
    反导系统:没有限制,于是我可以说布拉格条约还不如SALT I(给人的感觉是从“削减”回到了“限制”的时代)
    常规战略武器:没有限制,这可能会带来最严重的后果。不过常规SLBM可能是要算成核弹头,这是较积极的一点。
    “遥测数据交换”可能是“遥测数据加密”的同义词。
    冷战时期条约如果有“轰炸机全部算一枚”,结论是大大鼓励空基核力量的发展;今天的条件下,影响不大。可能是用来保证实际可用总弹头数的“留一手”措施。

还要等正式文本出来才能进一步分析。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-3-28 20:16 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 kktt 于 2010-3-28 20:24 编辑

New START treaty in numbers

Now that we have some firm information about key provisions of the New START treaty, we can estimate what kind of reductions we can expect. One should be cautious, of course, about predicting the future, but the broad picture is unlikely to change significantly once we see the text of the treaty (the definition of an "operationally deployed launcher" is probably the most important factor there) and know more about the U.S. plans regarding its strategic triad that will emerge from the Nuclear Posture Review process.

The broad picture is that in terms of numbers the reductions of the New START treaty will be, to put it mildly, extremely modest. In fact, Russia would not have to do anything at all - it is already in compliance with the new treaty (this is not to say that the treaty will not limit Russia - it will). The United States would probably have to do some real reductions, but nothing really dramatic is expected there as well - mostly it will be removing some ICBMs from silos. (It is interesting, in fact, how the treaty will deal with empty silos - both sides have some and they will probably reluctant to blow them up.)

The tables below summarize the current status of the U.S. and Russian forces and the possible composition of the forces by the time the New START treaty is set to end - about 2020. The first column show the data from the last "old" START data exchange - these show how many launchers the parties had at the time. Since the old START counts every nuclear capable launcher, whether they operational or not, this column is very much an absolute ceiling. For example, START requires counting SS-N-20 and Bulava SLBMs, although the former have long gone and the latter is yet to fly reliably. The actual state of affairs is in the second column - it shows the actual operationally deployed launchers and the total number of launchers available - the latter number includes, for example, submarines that are in overhaul but that are expected return to service.

The next column show how a New START force may look like - again, there is a separate count of "operationally deployed" launchers and the total number of launchers. The treaty will set separate limits for those - 700 and 800 respectively. It looks like only the United States would use this gap between the two categories - it would need it for the two Trident II submarines that will be in overhaul. Depending of how the treaty deals with empty ICBM silos, the United States could also use it for some of those. Russia, in fact, will also have some empty ICBM silos, so it is possible that it would make use of that provision as well.

The last column shows the New START count of warheads. Since every bomber will be counted as a single warhead, the total count would seriously underestimate the number of nuclear warheads in active service. For example, Russian 76 bombers are technically capable of carrying more than 800 warheads. The U.S. strategic bomber force has about 500 nuclear warheads assigned to it. So, the actual number of operationally deployed warheads will probably be closer to 2000 on each side, which is not much of a reduction compared to the Moscow Treaty.

Creative accounting notwithstanding, the New START treaty is a significant positive development - if only because it preserves some openness and accountability in nuclear affairs. Then, if everything works right, the treaty could probably provide the legal and institutional framework for deeper nuclear reductions. At least it should.


Russia
          July 2009 Old START         2010
Actual
operationally deployed launches (total launchers)         ca. 2020
New START
operationally deployed launchers (total launchers)
[estimate]         ca. 2020
New START warheads
[estimate]
ICBMs                                        
  SS-25         176         171                    
  SS-27 silo         50         50         60         60
  SS-27 road         15         18         27         27
  RS-24                             85         255
  SS-19         120         70                    
  SS-18         104         59         20         200
  Total ICBMs         465         367         192         542
SLBMs                                        
  Delta III/SS-N-18         6/96         4/64                    
  Delta IV/SS-N-23         6/96         4/64 (6/96)         4/64         256
  Typhoon/SS-N-20         2/40         0/0                    
  Borey/Bulava         2/36         0/0         4/64         384
  Total SLBMs         268         128 (164)         128         640
Bombers                                        
  Tu-160         13         13         13         13
  Tu-95MS         63         63         63         63
  Total bombers         76         76         76         76
TOTAL         809         571 (603)         396 (396)         1258


The United States
          July 2009 Old START         2010
Actual
operationally deployed launches (total launchers)         ca. 2020
New START
operationally deployed launchers (total launchers) [estimate]         ca. 2020
New START warheads
[estimate]
ICBMs                                        
  Minuteman III         500         450         300 (350)         300
  MX         50         0                    
  Total ICBMs         550         450         300 (350)         300
SLBMs                                        
  Trident I/C-4         4/96                              
  Trident II/D-5         14/336         12/288 (14/336)         12/288 (14/336)         1152
  Total SLBMs         268         288 (336)         288 (336)         1152
Bombers                                        
  B-1         47         0                    
  B-2         18         18         18         18
  B-52         141         93         80         80
  Total bombers         206         111         98         98
TOTAL         1188         849 (897)         686 (784)         1550
[Arms control] [March 27, 2010]

http://russianforces.org/blog/20 ... ty_in_numbers.shtml
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-3-30 20:09 | 显示全部楼层
http://thebulletin.org/web-editi ... essing-start-follow

Assessing START follow-on

BY PAVEL PODVIG | 29 MARCH 2010

After missing more than a few deadlines and achieving several so-called significant breakthroughs, the United States and Russia finally have reached an agreement on a new arms control treaty. It will be signed in Prague on April 8, almost a year to the day U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to begin treaty negotiations and Obama announced, also in Prague, his commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

So, was the treaty worth the wait? As a disarmament measure, it will be a very modest step. The treaty will set a ceiling of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads--technically a reduction of more than 30 percent from the current levels--but almost all of the reductions will be accomplished by changing the way the warheads are counted. That means most of the warheads will still be in the U.S. and Russian active arsenals. (I have posted some current numbers and projections on my "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces" website.)

Numbers alone, however, don't tell the whole story. In fact, they aren't all that important. Whether it is 1,550 warheads or 500 warheads, it's far too many. What is important is that the treaty provides the public with a way to hold the U.S. and Russian governments accountable for the nuclear weapons they possess. As I wrote a year ago, "A strong mechanism of transparency and verification is much more important than any specific number of warheads that the treaty eventually will mandate." It's a bit early to say if the new treaty will be able to deliver on this count, but it appears that it will: The final agreement should provide substantial openness of nuclear arsenals.

A bigger criticism of the new agreement is that it reduced the entire U.S.-Russian relationship to Cold-War-style arms control and little else. In fact, at various points over the last year, it looked as though the idea of "resetting" the U.S.-Russian relationship had given away to the minutiae of mundane topics such as the exchange of telemetry information. But the reality is that these disagreements are real, and it would have been wrong to expect that without the arms control process, Russia would have stopped worrying about, say, U.S. missile defense interceptors in Europe. Quite the opposite: As we saw during the George W. Bush years, in the absence of a dialogue, even small misunderstandings and unjustified fears can grow to grotesque proportions and poison the U.S.-Russian relationship for years to come.

If anything, the new treaty has offered both Washington and Moscow an opportunity to discuss their disagreements. The solutions might not be perfect, but the very fact that they were originated from a dialogue is an incredible step forward. For example, even though the new arms control treaty won't include limits on missile defense, Russia is now on the record stating its concern about the deployments and the United States is now on the record stating that Russia's concerns are unjustified. Obviously official communication won't solve the larger problem, but it should make the issue of missile defense much less politicized than it has been in the last 10 years or so.

Nor will the treaty by itself bring about complete nuclear disarmament. But it's an extremely important, necessary step toward that goal. So my answer is yes--the effort that went into formulating the new treaty was definitely worth it. With the caveat, of course, that it is only the first step of many.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-3-30 20:12 | 显示全部楼层
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/03/newstart.php

New START Treaty Has New Counting

By Hans M. Kristensen

The White House has announced that it has reached agreement with Russia on the New START Treaty. Although some of the documents still have to be finished, a White House fact sheet describes that the treaty limits the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles and long-range bombers on both sides to 1,550 and the number of missiles and bombers capable of launching those warheads to no more than 700.

The long-awaited treaty is a vital symbol of progress in U.S.-Russian relations and an important additional step in the process of reducing and eventually perhaps even achieving the elimination nuclear weapons. It represents a significant arms control milestone that both countries should ratify as soon as possible so they can negotiate deeper cuts.

On the other hand, while the treaty reduces the legal limit for deployed strategic warheads, it doesn’t actually reduce the number of warheads.  Indeed, the treaty does not require destruction of a single nuclear warhead and actually permits the United States and Russia to deploy almost the same number of strategic warheads that were permitted by the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

The major provisions of the New START Treaty are:

    * 1,550 deployed strategic warheads: Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit.
    * A limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
    * A limit of 100 non-deployed ICBM launchers (silos), SLBM launchers (tubes), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

These limits don’t have to be met until 2017, and will remain in effect for three years until the treaty expires in 2020 (assuming ratification occurs this year). Once it is ratified, the 2002 Moscow Treaty (SORT) falls away.

Verification Extended

The most important part of the new treaty is that it extends a verification regime at least a decade into the future. The inspections and other verification procedures in this Treaty will be simpler and less costly to implement than the old START treaty, according to the White House.

This includes on-site inspections. Each side gets a total of 18 per year, ten of which are actual warhead counts of deployed missiles and the remaining eight being “Type 2″ inspections of storage and dismantlement facilities.

Exchange of missile test telemetry data has been limited partly because it is not as necessary for verification as previously; there are other means for collecting this information. Even so, the treaty includes exchange of telemetry data for five test flights each year.

The Fine Print: Limits Versus Reductions

The White House fact sheet states that the new limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads is 74% lower than the 6,000 warhead limit of the 1991 START Treaty, and 30% lower than the 2,200 deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

That is correct, but the limit allowed by the treaty is not the actual number of warheads that can be deployed. The reason for this paradox is a new counting rule that attributes one weapon to each bomber rather than the actual number of weapons assigned to them. This “fake” counting rule frees up a large pool of warhead spaces under the treaty limit that enable each country to deploy many more warheads than would otherwise be the case. And because there are no sub-limits for how warheads can be distributed on each of the three legs in the Triad, the “saved warheads” from the “fake” bomber count can be used to deploy more warheads on fast ballistic missiles than otherwise.

Under the New START Treaty That’s One Nuclear Bomb!

The New START Treaty counts each nuclear bomber as one nuclear weapon even though U.S. and Russian bombers are equipped to carry up to 6-20 weapons each. This display at Barksdale Air Base shows a B-52 with six Air Launched Cruise Missiles, four B-61-7 bombs, two B83 bombs, six Advanced Cruise Missiles (now retired), and eight Air Launched Cruise Missiles. Russian bombers can carry up to 16 nuclear weapons.

.
The Moscow Treaty attributed real weapons numbers to bombers. The United States defined that weapons were counted as “operationally deployed” if they were “loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases.” As a result, large numbers of bombs and cruise missile have been removed from U.S. bomber bases to central storage sites over the past five years, leaving only those bomber weapons that should be counted against the 2,200-warhead Moscow Treaty limit.

Since the new treaty attributes only one warhead to each bomber, it no longer matters if the weapons are on the bomber bases or not; it’s the bomber that counts not the weapons. As a result, a base with 22 nuclear tasked B-52 bombers will only count as 22 weapons even though there may be hundreds of weapons on the base.

According to U.S. officials, the United States wanted the New START Treaty to count real warhead numbers for the bombers but Russia refused to prevent on-site inspections of weapons storage bunkers at bomber bases. As a result, the 36 bombers at the Engels base near Saratov will count as only 36 weapons even though there may be hundreds of weapons at the base.

If the New START Treaty counting rule is used on today’s postures, then the United States currently only deploys some 1,650 strategic warheads, not the actual 2,100 warheads; Russia would be counted as deploying about 1,740 warheads instead of its actual 2,600 warheads. In other words, the counting rule would “hide” approximately 450 and 860 warheads, respectively.

The paradox is that with the “fake” bomber counting rule the United States and Russia could, if they chose to do so, deploy more strategic warheads under the New START Treaty by 2017 than would have been allowed by the Moscow Treaty by 2012.

Force Structure Changes

How the new treaty and the “fake” counting rule will affect U.S. and Russian nuclear force structures depends on decisions that will be made in the near future. In the negotiations both Russia and the United States resisted significant changes to their nuclear forces structures.

Russia resisted restrictions on warheads numbers to keep some degree of parity with the United States. It achieved this by the “fake” bomber weapon count and the delivery platform limit that is higher than what Russia deploys today. Under the New START Treaty, Russia can deploy more strategic warheads on its ballistic missiles than it would have been able to under the Moscow Treaty, although it probably won’t do so due to retirement of older systems. It can continue all its current and planned force structure modernizations.

The United States resisted restrictions on its upload capability, which it achieved by the high limit on delivery platforms. The “fake” bomber count enables more weapons to be deployed on ballistic missiles and more weapons to be retained at bomber bases than would have been possible under the Moscow Treaty. The SLBM-heavy (in terms of warheads) U.S. posture “eats up” a large portion of the 1,550 warhead limit, so the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review soon to be completed will probably reduce the warhead loading on each SLBM, and possible cut about 100 missiles from the ICBM force. The incentive to limit bomber weapons further is gone with the new treaty, although it could happen for other reasons. All current and planned modernizations can continue.

Although Russia has thousands of extra weapons in storage, all its deployed missiles are thought to be loaded to near capacity. As a result, under the New START Treaty, Russia will have little upload capacity. The United States, on the other hand, has only a portion of its available warheads deployed and lots of empty spaces on its missiles. The large pool of reserve warheads available for potential upload creates a significant disparity in the two postures so it is likely that the Nuclear Posture Review will reduce the size of the reserve.

Estimated U.S. and Russian Strategic Warheads, 2017

Although the New START Treaty reduces the limit for deployed strategic warheads, a “fake” bomber weapon counting rule enables both countries to continue to deploy as many weapons as under the Moscow Treaty. A high limit for delivery vehicles protects a significant U.S. upload capacity, whereas Russia will have essentially none. Future force structure decisions might affect the exact numbers but this graph illustrates the paradox.

.
Conclusions and Recommendations

The New START Treaty is an important achievement in restarting relations with Russia after the abysmal decline during the Bush administration. And extending and updating the important verification regime creates a foundation for transparency and confidence building.

The treaty will also, if ratified quickly and followed up by additional reductions, assist in strengthening the international nonproliferation regime and efforts to prevent other countries from developing nuclear weapons.

The United States and Russia must be careful not to “oversell” the treaty as creating significant reductions in nuclear arsenals and strategic delivery systems. Although the treaty reduces the limit, the achievement is undercut by a new counting rule that enables both countries to deploy as many strategic warheads as under the Moscow Treaty.

Indeed, the New START Treaty is not so much a nuclear reductions treaty as it is a verification and confidence building treaty.  It is a ballistic missile focused treaty that essentially removes strategic bombers from arms control.

The good news is that a modest treaty will hopefully be easier to ratify.

Because the treaty protects current force structures rather than reducing them, it will inevitably draw increased attention to the large inventories of non-deployed weapons that both countries retain and can continue to retain under the new treaty. Whereas the United States force structure is large enough to permit uploading of significant numbers of reserve warheads, the Russian force is too small to provide a substantial upload capacity. Even with a significant production of new missiles, it is likely that Russia’s entire Triad will drop to around 400 delivery vehicles by 2017 – fewer than the United States has today in its ICBM leg alone. That growing disparity makes it imperative that the forthcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture Review reduces the number of delivery vehicles and reserve warheads.

To that end it is amazing to hear some people complaining that the U.S. deterrent is dilapidating and that the United States doesn’t gain anything from the New START Treaty. In the words of one senior White House official, the United States came away as a “clean winner.”

Because the treaty does not force significantly deeper reductions in the number of nuclear weapons compared with the Moscow Treaty, it is important that presidents Obama and Medvedev at the signing ceremony in Prague on 8 April commit to seeking rapid ratification and achieving additional and more drastic nuclear reductions.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-3-30 20:13 | 显示全部楼层
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/03/hardly-a-jump-start.php

Hardly a Jump START
Ivan Oelrich

Four months past a “deadline” imposed by the expiration of the old START treaty and amid much fanfare, President Obama announced  that he and Russian President Medvedev had agreed on a new arms control treaty.  I am not as excited as most are about the treaty and much of the following might be interpreted as raining on the parade so let me begin by saying that the negotiation of this treaty is an important step.  While not as big a step as I had hoped for, it is an essential step.

Whatever the actual reductions mandated by the treaty—and they are modest—it was vital to get the United States and Russia talking about nuclear weapons again.  The U.S. and Russia have at least 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons and they have to lead the world in nuclear reductions.  Without this first step there cannot be a second step and there are many steps between where we are today and a world free of nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration did not simply dismiss arms control as irrelevant but argued that negotiating agreements was actually counter productive, potentially creating confrontation where it would not otherwise arise.  Avoid talking and let sleeping dogs lie was the philosophy.  The Bush administration had the best of both worlds, from its perspective, by negotiating the nearly meaningless Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, SORT, sometimes called the Moscow Treaty, that simply allowed each side to declare their plans for what they were going to do anyway and contained no verification provisions.

This treaty is different.  The White House has released summaries of the main features of the treaty, not the full text, but it is clear this is a real treaty with real limits and real verification.  This treaty and, more importantly, the process that produced it, gets the arms control train back on the track.

Even so, this treaty is a modest step.  Hans Kristensen has described the numbers and their implications for the nuclear force structure.  The treaty makes some modest reductions from the SORT limits but not large enough changes to make a qualitative difference in the nuclear standoff between the legacy forces of the two Cold War superpowers.  (If anyone can explain to me why we and the Russians continue to need over a thousand nuclear bombs, each five to twenty five times more powerful than the bomb that flattened Hiroshima, pointed at each other, please send me an email. I want to know what the beef between us is that makes that seem proportionate.)

The treaty does not even approach territory that would call for a fundamental rethinking of how we deploy our nuclear weapons.  As the military would say, the treaty protects the force structure.  That is, we will still have a triad of bombers and both land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles, another obsolete artifact of the Cold War that dates back to fears of a disarming first strike from the Soviet Union (and inter-Service competition).  Even Air Force advocacy groups such as the Mitchell Institute have considered eliminating the nuclear mission for the manned bomber and moving from a triad to a dyad of land- and sea-based missiles. In fact, the treaty contains a peculiar counting rule that increases the importance of bombers:  each bomber counts only as one nuclear bomb although the B-52 can carry 20 nuclear-armed cruise missiles and the Russian bombers, for example the Backfire and Blackjack, have similar payloads.  If we define corn as a type of tree, then suddenly Iowa would be covered in forests.  If we define a bomber with 20 bombs as a single bomb, then suddenly we get a substantial reduction in the nuclear of weapons.  (Hans discusses the numbers in more detail.)  This rule reportedly resulted from Russia’s refusal to allow the necessary on-site inspections at its bomber bases but it creates an important caveat on any claim of “reductions.”

The treaty apparently does not address in any way nuclear weapon alert levels.  Most of the deployed weapons both sides will have under the treaty will be continuously ready to launch within minutes.  The treaty does nothing to restrict both nuclear powers to a no-first-use capability. If we wanted to reduce the threat that Russia and the U.S. pose to one another, we would be far better off to ignore the numbers of weapons but take weapons off alert so the current treaty has that exactly wrong.

Non-deployed warheads are not covered by the treaty at all as far as I can tell from the summaries.  Both sides will still retain thousands of nuclear weapons not mounted on missiles and these are not even counted, much less limited, by the treaty.  Apparently the verification of reserve warhead limits was too intrusive.  While inspection of warhead dismantlement facilities is allowed, I cannot tell from the summary exactly what is going to be verified.  I believe that the dismantlement itself will not be monitored.

One of the strengths of the treaty is that it limits actual missile warheads and provides for the verification of deployed missile warheads.  In the past, there has been no way to verify warhead numbers so treaties resorted to “counting rules,” that is, those things that could be counted, namely bombers, submarines, and missile silos, were counted and each launcher was simply assumed to have a certain number of nuclear warheads associated with it.  For example, if a type of missile had been tested with eight warheads, then all missiles of that type would be counted as having eight warheads regardless of the number actually mounted on top.  Thus, in previous treaties, limits on the number of warheads were indirect.  With this treaty, on-site inspections will allow each side to confirm though a limited number of spot-checks the number of missile warheads actually mounted on missiles.

The U.S. has wanted to keep the number of launchers high while accommodating modest reductions in the number of warheads.  It has done this up to now by removing (or off-loading) warheads from multiple warhead missiles.  The Russians have objected that this creates worrying breakout potential:  the U.S. could reactivate reserve warheads and quickly mount them back atop the existing missiles, called uploading.  In a crisis, this creates instability:  if the one side sees the other uploading warheads, there is a strong incentive to strike before the process can proceed to completion. This is the argument the Russians used for limits on launchers.  (Plus, of course, the Russians are short of money and want to reduce the number of their missiles anyway so better to get the Americans to come along with them.)  The U.S. accepted the Russian launcher number but was unwilling to proportionately cut warheads.  This creates a ratio of launchers and warheads that is not terrible but could be better.  Having several warheads atop each missile makes them relatively more attractive targets of a disarming surprise first strike;  this is called first strike instability.  So the conflicting goals of Russia and the U.S. have forced them into trading one form of crisis instability for another.  Note that, if reserve warheads were verifiably eliminated, the Russian fear of uploading would be addressed.

Given the very modest nature of the treaty, it should sail through ratification, in a normal political climate.  But this is not a normal political climate.  As Secretary Clinton pointed out, past arms control treaties have been ratified by the Senate by 90 votes or more.  But after the passage of the health care bill, the Republicans may be unwilling to give President Obama a foreign policy success. Senator McCain has said that there will be no more cooperation in the Senate for the rest of the year.  We shall see.  But clearly, the Senate Republicans’ no-compromise tactics may doom treaty ratification.  One thing seems certain to me:  the Republicans have shown remarkable party discipline in the Senate so treaty ratification will either fail or it will succeed with close to one hundred votes.  It depends on a political decision by the minority caucus.

I did not attend the White House briefing on the treaty but Hans did and reports that, according to the administration, many shortcomings of the treaty resulted from Russian resistance to intrusive verification measures.  If true, this bodes ill for future dramatic achievements, for example, limits on non-deployed warheads or verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads.  The Russians may, in part, be cautious about intrusive verification because it might reveal strategic vulnerabilities.  If this is so, then the U.S. could do much to allay those fears by moving away from a counterforce capability that threatens Russian central nuclear forces every minute of the day.

After all this complaining, I have to repeat my first point:  this is an important treaty, it gets us back on track, it should be welcomed, and ratified.  I wish it had been bolder, I wish it had taken bigger steps, I wish it had made qualitative as well as quantitative changes, but it moves entirely in the right direction.

What next?  This has long been described as a transitional treaty.  It was meant to be a bridge between the expired START treaty and the next treaty, which is going fundamentally reshape the nuclear relationship of the Cold War legacy nuclear powers.  We can hope so.  The treaty has a ten-year lifetime with the option to extend for another five.  If this is all we do for the next decade, it will, indeed, be disappointing.  We cannot think we are done, these laurels are far too small to rest on comfortably.  This treaty must be considered what it was sold as a year ago:  a stopgap to paste over the expiration of START while the transformational treaty is negotiated.  Alas, given the difficulty of negotiating this modest instrument, it may take ten years to get the next treaty.

If this treaty is a preview of the soon-to-be released nuclear posture review (NPR), then we will know that transformation of the nuclear danger is merely a theoretical aspiration not an actual goal of the administration.  If, on the other hand, the NPR calls for unilaterally reducing the alert rate of our nuclear forces, reduces the counterforce emphasis on nuclear weapons and their deployment, and lays out clear steps the U.S. intends to take soon toward a world free of nuclear weapons, then it could form the basis for a truly transformational next treaty with Russia.  Much of the wariness of the Russians is perfectly justified by the constant treat of a disarming U.S. first strike.  We have to change that reality first and then we can institutionalize it with a treaty.

Also, we must carefully weigh the domestic political price tag that the treaty is going to carry.  Even before the this treaty got out of the gate, or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was warmed up, the administration came in with a budget that included a $700M top up to the national labs.  This was widely considered a minimum down payment to get the labs and conservative Senators on board supporting the treaties.  It may well be, especially in light of recently released letters from the lab directors, that a new warhead development program (and not just a new warhead, but an ongoing program to institutionalize continuing production of new warheads into the indefinite future) will be the price for either treaty.  I am not convinced that that price is worth paying.  (It might if we did it right but that seems unlikely.  I will write again on that topic.)  In any case, if the treaty is not ratified, I think it is fair to use substantial budget cuts to make certain that the labs don’t start new warhead production.

The treaty is going to be signed in Prague on 8 April.  That is a Thursday, so I think we should be gracious and let the negotiators take that Friday and the rest of the weekend off but I hope that, on Monday 12 April, they will be back at work negotiating the real treaty, the one that changes fundamentally the insane calculus of the nuclear standoff between the U.S. and Russia.

[In the above, I made a slight edit.  In the original version from this morning, I said that "warheads" were counted, thinking that it was clear this meant missile warheads as opposed to bombs on bombers but some readers were confused.  I now say "missile warheads."]
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-3-30 20:16 | 显示全部楼层
http://scisec.net/?p=300

Does the Post START Accord Lower Warhead Numbers by 30%?

I should have made one small mention in my previous post on the post START accord. I refer to the "30%" lower warheads claim that appears in the White House's fact sheet on the post START arms control accord.

This claim has featured heavily in reporting. The claim states that the post START treaty lowers the number of deployed strategic warheads by 30% from the 2002 SORT (i.e. Moscow Treaty) limit.

The new accord sets a limit of 1550 warheads. The SORT treaty had an upper and lower bound. The upper bound was 2200. The lower bound, never cited in reports on post START, was 1700.

So the 30% claim is false.

True the US is currently at about the upper bound of 2200 deployed strategic warheads, but the White House fact sheet is comparing Obama's treaty with Bush's. It's clearly spin.

1700 is consistent with current nuclear war planning. The post START treaty shall limit launchers to a "combined" total of 800. That's towards the lower end of the range agreed under the Obama-Medvedev memorandum of understanding.

Relatively low launcher numbers is something Moscow would like about this accord. Low launcher numbers enables Russia to maintain what it calls "strategic parity", whilst appearing a tier above other strategic global powers, as cheaply as possible.

Don't underestimate the importance of this from Russia's perspective. I think this is why Moscow agreed to this accord despite grumbling about BMD and Prompt Global Strike.

However low launcher numbers relative to warhead numbers is also good from Strategic Command's perspective. I think that this enabled the Pentagon to assert that going to 1550 would not require a change in the overall nuclear war plan. A number of these launchers would be housed in submarines and bombers, so one would think that even at 1550 Strategic Command feels that it can meet its damage expectancy criteria for the class of targets that we associate with the counterforce mission.

In my previous post I had cited from the memo of understanding to the effect that the a post START treaty should have a provision on limiting strategic offensive arms to the national territory of each side. I kind of left that hanging there without any explanation. I should have talked a bit more about what I was trying to get at here.

This is interesting from a number of angles. First nothing is said about it in the White House fact sheet. A lot will hinge here on what is meant by "strategic offensive arms". The Russians were concerned that the Bush era BMD "third site" could have been converted to base such arms. A provision like this would prevent that. Secondly, it potentially prevents the US from basing any ICBM with conventional warheads outside the territory of the US. (n.b. boomers are "based" on shore but "patrol" at sea)

Now the White House fact sheet states that the new post START accord does not limit the deployment of PGS in any way. If you count a converted ICBM or SLBM for conventional strikes as being a strategic offensive arm, because of conventional counterforce, then this appears at variance with this article of the memo of understanding. The treaty definitions will matter.

However, let us return to the widely reported 30% claim.

Doing the same calculation using the SORT lower bound doesn't lead to such a jazzy figure like 30%.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-6 16:04 | 显示全部楼层
The New START bomber count and upload potential

The way the United States and Russia will be counting bombers in New START has raised some questions about the treaty - the change in counting rules in effect means that neither side would have to make any substantial cuts to comply with the new treaty. (See the projections I published earlier and Hans Kristensen's analysis.)

The United States said that it was ready to count bombers with their actual weapons load, but Russia objected to the transparency provisions that this arrangement would entail. This is not the first time Russia gets a bad rap for resisting transparency, but I don't think this is the case here. As Hans Kristensen noted, they could have counted each bomber as carrying, say, ten warheads. No transparency is needed for that.

Another possible reason for Russia's position on bombers is that if they were counted with their real weapons load, the United States would have to find some other place to cut 400 warheads. Most likely this would have been done primarily by "downloading" SLBMs. The problem with this, of course, is that it would increase the U.S. "upload potential" - the ability to quickly bring the warheads back.

Whether or not that was the real reason and regardless of whether the concerns about the upload potential are justified, Russia appears to have been consistent in pushing for lower number of launchers and, if that is not possible, for keeping the warhead limit relatively high to avoid increasing the upload potential. We know now, for example,  that it was Russia that insisted on putting 1675 into the "1500-1675" range agreed in Moscow in July 2009.

Whatever the real Russia's reasons, I am sympathetic to its position - reducing the number of warheads just by offloading them from missiles and keeping the capability to bring them back intact is not real reductions. Nuclear weapon states have to be held accountable for their nuclear-capable launchers as well At the time, I suggested keeping the old START count in place to do just that and it looks like the New START treaty will be able to do it to some extent.

As for the bombers, I'm not sure that Russia gained anything in particular there. We get better accountability for launchers, but leave quite a few warheads unaccountable. One can argue that Russia may be more worried about SLBMs than about bombers - it may well be the case. In any event, I don't think that the trick with bomber count weakens the treaty.
[Arms control] [March 31, 2010]

http://russianforces.org/blog/20 ... ber_count_and.shtml
东方红 发表于 2010-4-6 17:34 | 显示全部楼层
奥巴马今公布新核战略 承诺不对无核国家动核武  
2010年04月06日 11:16:00  来源: 中国日报网  

    据美国媒体4月6日报道,美国总统奥巴马将于美国时间4月6日正式公布新修订的核战略。奥巴马在接受《纽约时报》采访时透露,根据新的核战略,美国将不再发展任何新型核武器,减少动用核武器的机会,即使是在自卫的情况下。不过他同时强调,对像朝鲜和伊朗等违反或不接受核不扩散条约的国家,新战略并不适用。
    据悉,新战略首次明确了动用核武的条件,而自冷战时期美国的核政策一直有意模糊这一方面。新战略指出,美国将不会对非拥核国家使用核武器,即使美国受到来自该国的生化袭击或网络攻击。奥巴马说,美国将只动用传统武器。不过白宫方面却表示,一旦生物武器袭击威胁到国家安全,美国将有可能重新考虑使用核武器。
    美国媒体认为,奥巴马修改核战略是适应核安全形势的变化,即传统的核大国不再是美国最大的威胁,恐怖组织和所谓“流氓国家”才是新战略针对的对象。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-6 19:36 | 显示全部楼层
美俄核军控谈判“尘埃落定” 新条约成果几何?

  经过美国和俄罗斯军控代表为期一年的紧张谈判,加之两国总统的14次电话磋商,新的美俄战略武器削减条约(即《关于进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器措施的条约》,或称“START后续条约”)总算是“尘埃落定”了。这份姗姗来迟的新条约意义非凡,引用奥巴马的话说,这是美俄两国“今后约20年中一份最全面的军控协议”。3月26日上午,美国总统奥巴马和俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫通过电话达成共识:新条约表明了他们的承诺,即“两国将在《核武器不扩散条约》规定下,一道履行削减核武库义务。这种行动促使两国共同努力加强国际防扩散体制,并说服其他国家制止核扩散”。

  美国政界对条约在国会获批持乐观态度

  虽然条约在布拉格签署基本上已成铁定事实,但是要在签约国生效,还需要各自经过俄罗斯杜马或美国国会参议院的批准。据消息人士透露,条约的主体文本大概有20页,它是近几个月来谈判的重点。日内瓦的谈判人员还制定了一份100-150页的议定书,阐明了相关的技术条款和核查程序。除此以外,START后续条约还将包括一个技术附件。这三个部分均具有法律效力,政府将把它们一并提交参议院征求相关建议,并最终获得批准许可。负责武器控制和国际安全的副国务卿埃伦.O.陶舍尔称,条约和议定书已经完成,包含了双方共同商定的基本权利和义务,目前附件部分仍在谈判中。3月26日,美国国务卿希拉里.R.克林顿表示,谈判被推迟的其中一个原因是,双方希望在宣布成功之前完成条约和议定书的谈判。

  美国国务卿克林顿称,“我们已经不需要如此庞大的核武库来保护我们的国家和盟友应对今天所面临的两个最大威胁:核武器扩散和恐怖主义。”据她预计,新的START将在适当的时候获得参议院的批准,“我不想设定任何时间表,但我们有信心能够使START后续条约获得批准”。

  在3月29日美国国务院召开的新闻发布会上,负责武器控制和国际安全的副国务卿埃伦.O.陶舍尔宣布:“我们的目标是在这个春季后期提交 START后续条约,并寻求在年底获得批准”。

  3月28日,外交关系委员会主席、参议员约翰克里表示,他将“在未来几周内”举行听证会,“我相信通过听证,将使我们的同事和美国人民更加确信START后续条约将使我们的世界更安全”。

  据悉,一旦《关于进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器措施的条约》4月8日在布拉格完成签署后,美国政府将在5月前把它提交给国会,这时政府已经完成了对条约的逐条分析,并将对其予以详细解释,此外,还将从理论上留出足够的时间在美国参议院外交关系和武装部队委员会举行听证会,然后在8月休会前报告委员会之外的批准决议,2010年秋季,将在整个参议院内部举行投票表决。但据来自参议院两个党派的工作人员透露,作为少数派的共和党很可能在2010 年中期选举前不急于展开条约的表决,这会使条约的批准日期推迟到2010年底甚至2011年。

  有关核武库的削减问题

  新条约将双方可以部署的战略或远程核武器数量削减“约三分之一”,部署型战略核弹头和炸弹的数量上限设为1550枚,比2002年《战略进攻性武器削减条约》(SORT)设定的2200枚上限降低了30%。这些核弹头或炸弹所对应的部署型和非部署型发射装置(包括洲际弹道导弹的地基发射井、潜射弹道导弹的潜艇发射管以及执行核任务的重型轰炸机)总数量上限为800具,这里所谓的“非部署型发射装置”是指诸如检修中的“三叉戟”潜艇等。其中,部署型发射装置的上限为700具,比START条约规定的1600具上限减少了50%多。新条约所规定的削减目标要在条约生效后的7年内完成,START后续条约效力期限为10年,此外还可额外延长5年。

  根据新条约,常规弹头可以装备到战略导弹上,正如美国当前构建的“快速全球打击”能力,但这将受到条约的计数限制。而“三叉戟”潜艇改装后携带常规巡航导弹以及轰炸机完全转换为常规作战任务,则不再纳入条约限制。新的START条约要求美国当前部署的核力量将削减近百分之三十,根据美国去年宣布的部署型战略核弹头数2126枚,虽然已达到SORT要求,但新START条约还将在此基础上削减27%。美国当前拥有约900具战略发射装置,新条约将会在此基础上削减约10%。根据不代表政府立场的非政府组织估计,俄罗斯约有2600-2700部署型战略核弹头,新条约要求将在此基础上削减40%。俄罗斯现有的部署型投送系统数量估计不到新条约规定的700具上限,因此,俄方最初提出了500具战略投送系统的上限。

  针对总统提交国会的2011财年国家核安全管理局武器活动预算申请增加了10%(即6亿美元经费预算),麦康奈尔表示赞赏,“美国的核威慑需要必要的投资。确保核武器的安全、保安和可靠性是总统的职责”。即便如此,他在写给总统的信中还称,增加的经费是“不够的”,而政府全力在核现代化上投资也“将对参议院考虑START后续条约时产生重大影响。

  有关战斗部核查的问题

  《关于进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器措施的条约》的核查制度既包含原START的相关条文,又增加了新的条文,还涵盖了以前没有限定的项目。例如,原START并没有直接限制核弹头,而是为每个发射装置分配一定数量的核弹头。虽然一些发射装置给出了可配备的弹头数量上限,但未必是实际数量。新START对部署型核弹头和核炸弹给出了直接限制,允许双方通过现场视察争强互信,使这些限制得以落实。

  3月26日,参谋长联席会议主席迈克尔马伦海军上将在新闻发布会上称,新条约的特征是“具有更加有效、透明的核查方式,它要求更加快捷的数据交换和通告”。美国专家克里称,“它使我们第一次能够搞清俄罗斯核导弹上真实的弹头数目”。由于目前双方都没有在其重型轰炸机部署核炸弹或巡航导弹,而是将这些核炸弹或巡航导弹置于库存状态,致使对轰炸机的现场视察将无法看到此类武器。因此,新条约将把每架轰炸机计为一枚弹头,尽管贮存中的数百枚弹头或炸弹可以装备到一架轰炸机上。本条约规定,一旦核弹头或炸弹从部署型发射装置上移走,将不再受到条约限制。

  核查方面一个更为困难的问题是,必须确定双方可以共享多少的导弹飞行试验数据或遥测数据。据“纽约时报” 3月26日透露,“奥巴马团队认为克里姆林宫会同意START核查程序的更新版本”。START禁止对遥测数据进行加密(除了有限的例外情形),而俄方反对这种公开性,他们认为在 START条约中的禁令是不可或缺的,因为START后续条约限制了新型导弹的研发,而新条约却没有涉及此类问题。3月26日,美国防部长盖茨称,新条约达成的一个折中方案是,各方每年最多可交换5次导弹试验的遥测信息。他说,“新条约中的遥测远不如以前条约中那么重要,事实上,我们并不需要遥测来监督条约的执行”。“我认为,当情报界的证词送交国会山时,国家情报主任(DNI)和专家们会说,他们对START后续条约的核查条文的规定感到满意,这已经足以让他们很好地监督俄罗斯的履约情况,反之亦然”。

  有关限制导弹防御系统的问题

  盖茨在白宫的简报称,“导弹防御不受这一条约的约束”。俄罗斯为限制美国的导弹防御作出了最后一刻的努力,这一议题所激发的矛盾在2010年 2月罗马尼亚宣布在其国内建设美国在欧洲的一个拦截弹发射基地后进一步凸显出来。2月24日美俄两国总统的电话会谈使本次核裁军谈判陷入低谷,“梅德韦杰夫坚持发表联合声明,对导弹防御进行限制“,据3月26日纽约时报引述美国官员的说法,奥巴马当时拒绝了梅德韦杰夫的提议,但建议各方以不具备法律效力的方式发表单方面声明,详述各方立场。

  由于俄罗斯担心美国的导弹防御计划,俄方通过发表声明,敦促新的START确定“进攻性武器和导弹防御之间的关联”,参议院少数党领导人麦康奈尔等人3月15日写信给奥巴马说:参议院不太可能批准包含这种关联(即进攻性武器和导弹防御之间的关联)的条约,包括含有俄罗斯单方面声明的条约,因为俄罗斯可能会以此来对抗当前和以后各界美国政府作出的导弹防御决策。

  以前的美俄战略武器军控条约(包括START)均提到了反导系统的部署和进攻性战略平衡之间的关联。这些条约还包括俄罗斯的单方面声明,指出美国若从1972年《反弹道导弹条约》退出后,继续进行部署战略导弹拦截弹活动则可作为俄罗斯退出条约的事实基础。2001年7月22日,美国总统布什和俄罗斯总统普京在意大利热那亚会见后发表联合声明,一致认为“进攻性和防御性系统”是“相互关联的问题”。

  总而言之,条约的达成是奥巴马团队在外交方面取得的一项重大成就,然而,这只是实现了他提出的“无核武器世界”构想的第一步。在即将召开的 “核不扩散条约”(NPT)大会上,奥巴马和梅德韦杰夫将邀请世界其他公认核国家展开高级别的对话,将共同讨论如何提高其核力量的透明度,打造更高的信任度,以推进最终消除核武器目标的实现。(谢武)

  相关阅读:

  美国核武库一览 实现“无核武器世界”尚且遥远

  目前,美国的核武库约有近5200枚核弹头,其中现役核弹头2700枚,包括2200枚战略核弹头和500枚战术核弹头,还有2500枚处于后备或非现役状态的核弹头(包括150枚左右作为备件)。美国的战略核力量包括450枚“民兵”III陆基洲际弹道核导弹、部署在14艘核动力弹道导弹潜艇上的288枚潜地弹道核导弹、60架执行主战任务的战略轰炸机及其运载的核武器。2009年4月,奥巴马在布拉格提出最终消除所有核武器,推进实现“无核武器世界”的宣言,受到世界和平人士的广泛赞誉,美国前政府官员基辛格等4位前政要还联合撰写了题为“无核武器世界”的文章。然而,就目前来看,实现这一理想化构想的道路尚且遥远,美国政府不仅需要大幅削减核力量,还必须重新确立核武器在国家安全战略中的地位。

  悉数俄罗斯核武库家底 战略核力量现代化是重点

  据估计,截至2009年底,俄罗斯实战型核武库中约有4600枚核弹头,包括约2600枚战略核弹头和2000枚非战略核弹头,数量比去年略有下降,此外,预计另有7300枚核弹头处于后备或待拆解状态。因此,俄罗斯总计约有1.2万枚核弹头,据信存放在48个永久性库存场址中。与美国通过库存管理计划对现有弹头进行延寿不同,俄罗斯核库存的持续维护及可靠性是通过对弹头的定期重复制造实现的。为了更大程度上同美国的做法保持一致,2009年 7月梅德韦杰夫宣布,到2011年俄罗斯将开发超级计算机,以测试其核威慑的有效性。有人声称,俄罗斯已经秘密进行了低当量核试验,但证据并不充分,这是至今仍有争议的问题。(来源: 中国网)
shaolin1254 发表于 2010-4-6 20:47 | 显示全部楼层
奥巴马今公布新核战略 承诺不对无核国家动核武  
2010年04月06日 11:16:00  来源: 中国日报网  

     ...

东方红 发表于 2010-4-6 17:34

承诺不对无核国家动核武----这承诺有啥用?对无核国家,美国的常规武器就可以解决问题。承诺不首先使用核武器才有看头。接下去就看美国如何界定那些国家是无核国家了,这个很有看头。以色列、伊朗、朝鲜都如何界定
东方红 发表于 2010-4-6 21:12 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 东方红 于 2010-4-6 21:15 编辑

“不过他同时强调,对像朝鲜和伊朗等违反或不接受核不扩散条约的国家,新战略并不适用。”
——人家已经明确表态了。
美国就是无赖,连奥巴马也没什么两样。别说美国,就连中国无条件承诺不对无核国家使用核武器都没人信。
不过话说回来,美国不首先使用核武器的可能性本身,要比美国承诺不首先使用核武器的可能性还高。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-8 19:28 | 显示全部楼层
中新网4月8日电 综合媒体报道,俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫与美国总统奥巴马于当地时间4月8日中午在捷克首都布拉格签署了两国关于削减进攻性战略武器的新条约。

  当地时间8日中午,俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫与美国总统奥巴马在捷克总统府西班牙大厅举行了隆重的签约仪式。双方签署了俄美削减进攻性战略武器的新条约。

  梅德韦杰夫与奥巴马随即举行联合新闻发布会。

  其后,两人将出席捷克总统克劳斯为他们举办的庆祝午宴。

  削减进攻性战略武器新条约取代了美国与前苏联1991年达成的《削减战略武器条约》以及2002年《莫斯科条约》(Moscow Treaty)。1991年的《削减战略武器条约》已于2009年12月过期失效。

  克里姆林宫新闻处消息称,新条约期限为10年。在接下来的10年当中,俄罗斯和美国只能在各自境内部署进攻性战略武器。

  两国总统签署新条约后,还必须将条约提交给俄罗斯议会和美国国会,获得二者批准通过,新条约才能生效。

  根据新条约,俄美双方需全面裁减冷战时期部署的核弹头与导弹。与2002年的《莫斯科条约》相比,两国需各自减少1/3的核弹头数量,将各自的核弹头数量限制在1550枚以下。同时,将洲际弹道导弹发射架、潜舰发射弹道导弹发射架及配备核武的重型轰炸机等战略武器运载工具的水平降低50%以上,总数以800为上限。

  梅德韦杰夫认为,俄美签署削减进攻性战略武器新条约是一个“具有里程碑意义的事件”,对于“欧洲和全球来说都非常重要”,它将决定未来的全球核裁军进程。

  梅德韦杰夫表示,削减核武“这样的大事并不经常发生”,因此他希望,两国条约的签署将“在很大程度上决定最近数年全球范围内的裁军进程、合作进程、不扩散大规模杀伤性武器的进程。”

  美国总统奥巴马则表示,这是美国“头一次将防止核扩散和核恐怖主义放置在其核议程的首要位置”。而之所以选择在布拉格签署条约,是因为奥巴马1年前在同一地点向全球宣告了他“无核世界”的构想。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-8 19:29 | 显示全部楼层



 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-8 19:30 | 显示全部楼层
  新华网布鲁塞尔4月8日电(国际观察)美俄核裁军新条约六大看点

  新华社记者王晓郡 张崇防 刘江

  美俄元首定于8日在捷克首都布拉格签署新的核裁军条约,这是美俄核裁军历史上的一个重要事件。从条约谈判过程透露出的若干细节以及美俄近来发表的相关言论判断,新条约似乎埋有“伏笔”且充满“暗算”,颇有看头。从国际社会的关注度来看,新条约至少具有以下六大看点。

  看点一:被削减核弹头能否走上“不归路”?

  美俄进行核裁军谈判已有40多个年头,核弹头数量看似一减再减。但实际上,双方都存在对核弹头“裁而不减”、 “削而不毁”的现象。此前签署的条约只是规定了削减的数量,至于如何处理削减下来的核弹头,条约则未作出硬性要求。其间,美俄均自行销毁了少数核弹头,但双方在此问题上的态度明显不同。俄方一直坚持对削减下来的核弹头彻底销毁,而美国基本上是把国防部管理的已部署核弹头裁减之后存放于能源部的库房里。对于今后裁减的核弹头究竟是“绝对销毁”还是“异地存放”,新条约如何规定是国际社会关注的一大焦点。

  看点二:对削减投放工具怎样“精打细算”?

  有效的核打击能力在很大程度上取决于投放工具的数量和质量,若核弹头投送不顺利,就等于是“死弹”。在核弹头投放方式上,美俄存在很大差别。美方的强项在于海基投放,俄方的优势则在于陆基投放。美海军拥有14艘战略导弹核潜艇,共有1152枚分导式核弹头。美国现役2200枚战略核弹头的一半以上部署在最隐蔽机动的水下发射平台,这是俄方最为担心的投放力量。但俄方拥有的可携带多枚核弹头而且可变轨的“白杨-M”战略核导弹,具有强大的突防能力,现役的此类导弹总共可安装1090枚核弹头,这是俄方的“杀手锏”,更是美国的心腹大患。新条约如何削减海基、陆基、空基等各类投放工具的数量,能否让双方实现优势平衡,格外引人注目。

  看点三:谁愿为俄罗斯销毁核弹头“埋单”?

  俄罗斯一直坚持彻底销毁被削减下来的核弹头,因为核武器不像常规武器,即使废弃生锈也不会产生危害,核武器保存不好、维护不及时就可能引发重大灾难。但销毁核武器需要巨额费用,而俄罗斯难以支付。20多年来,俄一直要求西方国家提供巨额款项,资助其销毁核武器。而西方国家也担心俄罗斯的核武器及技术外流,为此,八国集团在2002年就答应在此后10年里提供200亿美元帮助俄罗斯削减核武库存并确保武器不流入恐怖组织手中。但在当前全球金融和经济危机的背景下,新条约能否就西方继续资助俄罗斯作出承诺或安排?这也是一大悬念。

  看点四:对裁减情况如何进行有效核查?

  据消息人士透露,新条约的主体文本大概有20页。除此之外,还有一份多达上百页的议定书以及附件,主要涉及相关的技术条款和核查程序。3月26日,美参谋长联席会议主席迈克尔·马伦海军上将在新闻发布会上称,新条约的特征是“具有更加有效、透明的核查方式,它要求更加快捷的数据交换和通告”。但双方在核查问题上仍存在较大分歧。尽管俄方坚持,双方的核武器裁减应该“可核查”、“不可逆”,从而确保双方履行条约,但同时反对完全公开导弹飞行试验数据和遥测数据,以防美国“彻底搞清楚俄罗斯核导弹上真实的弹头数目”。美方同意核查,但要求进行简单、低费用的核查。新条约对核查的方式和手段将作出怎样的规定,无疑也是一大看点。

  看点五:“矛”“盾”冲突能否缓和化解?

  美国近30年来一直致力于研发和部署导弹防御系统。俄罗斯对此一直保持高度警惕,担心美国在减少“矛”的同时,增加“盾”的厚度,并最终打破战略平衡,对俄构成安全威胁。奥巴马去年9月宣布取消其前任布什在捷克和波兰部署陆基导弹防御系统的计划。但许多军事专家认为,美国其实是换汤不换药,是在用“新计划”取代“旧计划”、用新技术替代旧技术。据报道,美将在2020年以前分4个阶段在大西洋和地中海部署造价更低、机动性更好、拦截效果更佳的海基导弹防御系统。正因如此,俄罗斯坚决要求美国在核裁军新条约中把“矛”与“盾”一并考虑。俄外长拉夫罗夫4月6日在莫斯科重申,一旦美国导弹防御系统在数量和质量上的突破对俄战略核力量产生实质性影响,俄将有权退出新条约。新条约究竟对解决“矛”“盾”冲突做了哪些明确规定,值得期待。

 看点六:新条约能否顺利获得议会批准?

  美俄元首即将签署的新条约还需在美国参议院和俄罗斯国家杜马通过后方能生效,否则将是一纸空文。按照批准程序,美国国务院首先要对新条约三份文件(条约文本、议定书和附件)进行解读,然后安排听证会,最后进行表决。新条约若生效必须在参议院100个席位中获得至少67张赞成票,这意味着除了民主党的赞成票外,还需从共和党和独立派议员中获得支持。应该说,获得通过的难度不小。奥巴马推动表决医改法案,造成了民主、共和两党的空前对立。如果将批准程序推迟到明年,考虑到执政党在中期选举中通常会丢票,届时新条约获参院通过的难度会更大。就俄方来说,俄国家杜马在对美斗争中积累了丰富的经验和技巧,将会“根据需要”通过或者否决新条约。这些都关系到新条约能否生效,必将成为人们的后续热门看点。
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-8 19:35 | 显示全部楼层
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-8 19:36 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 kktt 于 2010-4-8 21:19 编辑

http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/511

Statement of Russian Federation on missile defense

    The Treaty Between Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Forces that was signed in Prague on April 8, 2010 can work and be viable only in conditions in which there is no qualitative and quantitative improvement of the capabilities of the missile defense systems of the United States of America. Therefore, the extraordinary conditions, mentioned in the Article XIV of the Treaty, include such an improvement of the capabilities of the missile defense systems of the United States of America that would result in a threat to the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

俄罗斯声明:削核新条约将仅在美反导系统不威胁俄方时有效

俄新网RUSNEWS.CN布拉格4月8日电 在签署削减进攻性战略武器新条约的同时发布的俄罗斯单方面声明称,由俄罗斯总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫和美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马8日在布拉格签署的削减进攻性战略武器条约将在美国扩大导弹防御系统不对俄罗斯潜在的战略核力量构成威胁的情况下有效运作。

声明中指出:“俄美于2010年4月8日在布拉格市签署的进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约将仅在这种条件下有效并可行,即当美国没有在数量与质量上扩大导弹防御系统时。”

文中还写道:“因此,条约第14条中提到的例外情况同样包括将对俄罗斯联邦潜在的战略核力量构成威胁的美国导弹防御系统的这种扩大。”
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-8 21:19 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 kktt 于 2010-4-9 18:26 编辑

俄美削核新条约禁止将进攻性武器改装成防御武器

俄新网RUSNEWS.CN布拉格4月8日电 俄美削减进攻性战略武器新条约禁止将进攻性武器改装成防御武器,反之亦然。这是俄罗斯国家杜马国际事务委员会主席康斯坦丁·科萨切夫今天向记者作出的表示。

科萨切夫说:“新条约第5条规定,禁止将进攻性武器改装成防御武器,反之亦然。”

Article V, Section 3:
    Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.

美国人曾讨论过将三叉戟改装为反导拦截弹,根据新条约,这是被禁止的。当然,美国还是可以研制新的潜射反导弹的,比如KEI的潜基版本。

http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/nov_04_20.php

    There are two submarine platforms the MDA could leverage for a sea-based missile-defense capability. The better known of these is the Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, the SSBN. These boats represent the most survivable leg of the country’s strategic triad. They routinely patrol in open ocean areas carrying up to 24 Trident ballistic missiles capable of reaching any area in the world.
    The SSBNs, prowling mid-ocean areas where they are virtually impossible to locate, would carry a mix of strategic and KEI [Kinetic Energy Interceptor] missiles, enabling them to continue deterrent patrols while providing a defensive capability against hostile missiles in the midcourse phase of flight.
 楼主| kktt 发表于 2010-4-8 21:20 | 显示全部楼层
俄总统:俄美或就共同参与建立全球反导系统达成一致

俄新网RUSNEWS.CN布拉格4月8日电 俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫在布拉格举行的新闻发布会上表示,俄罗斯和美国可能就共同参与建立全球反导系统问题达成一致。

他表示,俄罗斯愿与美国在建立反导问题上紧密合作。

梅德韦杰夫说:“我们愿与我们的美国伙伴在这个问题上进行最紧密的合作。我们很重视美国现政府就布什政府在反导系统问题上的决定所采取的步骤。这在很大程度上促进了进步。”

梅德韦杰夫指出,我们在理解上没有任何分歧。

他补充说:“有研究这个问题的愿望和毅力。我们也向美方提出在建立全球反导系统方面提供服务,这还有待考虑。”
JK-SETI 发表于 2010-5-3 22:10 | 显示全部楼层
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/05/downloading.php

翻译:

看起来,美国似乎将提前履行不足一个月前与俄罗斯签订的新START条约
(美国)国务院最新的情况报告书很好地证明了这一点,该报告中提及在2009年12月31日,美国总共部署了1968枚战略核弹头
新START条约规定,在2017年前,部署的战略核弹头数量要减少到1550枚。但是按照现今的裁减核弹头速度,今年年底美国就能达到这个标准。
2002年签订莫斯科条约之后,美国平均每年从弹道导弹和轰炸机基地中裁掉490枚战略核弹头,至今总计削减3436枚左右。现在美国的轰炸机基地中只有一百多枚战略核弹头,绝大多数的战略核弹头都集中装载在弹道导弹上。
上一次美国部署的战略核弹头少于2000枚远在1956年,而最多的时候在1987年,达到12790枚.
美国如此迅速地裁减战略核弹头恰恰显示了即使在新START条约的标准下,美国军方对其核力量的威慑力充满信心。如果有必要,数千枚存放在仓库里未部署的核弹头也可以重新装载在弹道导弹和轰炸机上。
尽管如此,迅速裁减核武器仍强化了奥巴马政府核不扩散条约审议大会的立场:美国对核军备控制的态度是严肃的。
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